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A child is born in the United States (“U.S.”) to a recently wed U.S.
citizen father and Japanese mother. The parents live happily for several
years, but begin to experience irreconcilable differences in their marriage
and ultimately seek a divorce. In the dissolution proceedings, the judge
orders joint custody of the child. A few years later, to the father’s dismay,
he receives an international phone call from the mother informing him
that her “visit” to Japan with the child would be perpetual and that she
does not intend to return to the U.S. with the child. The mother
subsequently appears before a Japanese court, where she obtains an order
granting her sole custody. Although the father has a conflicting American
court order assigning him valid custody rights, that order is not recognized
by the Japanese judge. Just like that, the father’s life has taken a turn for
the worst as he realizes that his child is six-thousand miles away and there
may be nothing he can do about it.
Meanwhile, in Japan, hope is on the horizon for a new family as a
Japanese man and an American woman get married and welcome a child
of their own. Unfortunately, after several years, the marriage begins to
crumble. When divorce proceedings are initiated, the mother and father
decide to keep the custody issue out of court because they are aware of
Japanese courts’ tendency to designate sole custody to one parent. They
do not wish to risk uncertainty regarding who will receive legal custody
of the child. Instead, the parents make an agreement to share decisionmaking authority with regard to the child. As it turns out, the mother had
secretly intended all along to take the child back to the U.S. and create a
permanent home there. Upon the mother’s petition, an American court
grants her sole custody of the child without any consideration of the
potential rights of the father in Japan. The father soon realizes that his
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child may be gone forever. As he gazes into the night sky, he wonders
helplessly what his child is doing at that exact moment. Meanwhile, sixthousand miles away, another left-behind father solemnly watches the
sunrise, contemplating the same of his own child. In the end, international
parental child abduction shattered not one, but two, parental bonds,
leaving a pair of broken hearts and empty souls on opposite ends of the
world.
The above example illustrates the importance of a major goal in the
realm of international child abduction: to prevent parents from taking their
children across national borders to seek favorable custody rulings from
sympathetic courts that are not obliged to consider the conflicting rights
of left-behind parents. The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (“the Convention”) is a multilateral treaty
that was enacted to achieve that purpose. However, as discussed below,
the Convention has its shortcomings and the need for a more equitable
consideration of the interests of children remains.
I. BACKGROUND
The Convention concluded on October 25, 1980.1 As of September
2014, ninety-three countries are Members of the Convention,2 which
recognizes that in custody arrangements, the children’s interests are of
utmost importance.3 As such, the Convention has two explicit aims: “(a)
to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in
any Contracting State; and (b) to ensure that rights of custody and access
1. Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983) [hereinafter
Convention]. The Convention is a non-self-executing treaty, meaning that domestic
legislation is required to implement it into force in a State’s domestic law. D. MARIANNE
BLAIR, et. al, FAMILY LAW IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW 432 (2d ed. 2009).
2. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, STATUS TABLE UNDER THE
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 [hereinafter
STATUS TABLE]. Each country became a Member of the Convention either by ratification,
accession, or succession, and subsequently entered it into force. Id. In China, however, the
Convention applies only in Hong Kong and Macao. Id. (follow the “View and/or print full
status report” hyperlink; then follow the letter “C” hyperlink next to the “People’s Republic of
China.”)
3. The opening sentence of the Convention provides: “The States signatory to the
present Convention, Firmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount
importance in matters relating to their custody. . .” Convention, supra note 1.
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under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in the
other Contracting States.”4 Removal or retention of a child is “wrongful”
where it amounts to a “breach of rights of custody” belonging to someone
“under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident5
immediately before the removal or retention,” where those custody rights
were in fact exercised, or would have been exercised, but for the child’s
removal or retention.6
Although the goals of the Convention are seemingly straightforward,
achieving them in practice is more problematic, particularly in light of the
Article 12 and Article 13 exceptions to the general rule requiring the
prompt return of a child to his or her State of habitual residence.7 Article
12 requires the return of a wrongfully removed or retained child where
judicial or administrative proceedings commence within one year after the
date on which the child was removed or retained.8 If more than one year
passes before the commencement of such proceedings, the return of the
child is likewise required, “unless it is demonstrated that the child is now
settled in its new environment.”9 Notwithstanding the specifications of
Article 12, Article 13(b) states that the return of the child is not required
if one who opposes the child’s return affirmatively shows that “there is a
grave risk that [the] return would expose the child to physical or
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation.”10
Several provisions of the Convention provide that judicial and
administrative authorities are not to equate their decisions under the
4. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1.
5. Id. The Convention does not define “habitual residence,” as the term is meant
to be fluid. Id. In the U.S., the “habitual residence” is presumed to be the particular State
where the child lived prior to being abducted. Julia A. Todd, The Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Are the Convention’s Goals Being
Achieved?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 553, 558 (1994). Courts have split on the issue
of whether “habitual residence” is properly determined by the subjective intentions of the
parties or objective indicators (e.g., the child’s adaption to the new environment). Tai
Vivatvaraphol, Back To Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence in
International Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
3325, 3325 (2009).
6. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3. Article III of the Convention also states that
rights of custody may arise either by operation of law, judicial or administrative order, or
the existence of an agreement having legal effect under the laws of the State of habitual
residence. Id.
7. Id. at arts. 12−13.
8. Id. at art. 12.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id. at art. 13(b) (emphasis added). Also, Article 20 codifies a rarely invoked,
but potentially significant exception, providing that a child need not be returned if “the
fundamental principles of the requested State relating to the protecting of human rights
and fundamental freedoms” would not allow for the return. Id. at art. 20.

212

ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

[VOL. 16: 209, 2014]

10/10/2016 3:27 PM

Hague Abduction Convention Compliance
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

Convention with the merits of the underlying custody arrangement.11
American courts have interpreted that language to imply that the courts of
an abducted-to nation lack jurisdiction to decide the merits of underlying
custody disputes; instead, custody determinations are properly left to the
courts of the country of “habitual residence.”12 One rationale for that
interpretation is that preserving the status quo of prior custody arrangements
will deter parents from removing children across international borders to
seek more sympathetic courts.13 This principle is consistent with the spirit
of the Convention.14
II. THE UNITED STATES VERSUS JAPAN AS MEMBER STATES
TO THE CONVENTION
The U.S. ratified the Convention on July 1, 1988.15 To implement the
Convention into domestic law, the U.S. enacted the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”).16 The U.S. government then
promulgated rules to help implement ICARA. 17 Pursuant to ICARA,
Convention actions may be heard in either state or federal courts.18 The
requisite burden of proof for a successful Article 13(b) defense is “clear
and convincing evidence,” whereas other exceptions enumerated in
Article 12 or Article 13 only require a “preponderance of the evidence.”19

11. These provisions include Articles 16, 17, and 19. For instance, Article 19 states,
“a decision under this Convention concerning the return of a child shall not be taken to be
a determination on the merits of any custody issue.” Id. at art. 19; see also id. at arts.
16−17.
12. See, e.g., Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063−64 (6th Cir. 1996).
13. Id. at 1064.
14. See generally Convention, supra note 1 (expressing the desire to prevent the
wrongful removal or retention of children internationally on the assumption that such removal
or retention would harmfully impact them).
15. STATUS TABLE, supra note 2.
16. International Child Abduction Remedies Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2012)
[hereinafter ICARA].
17. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE UNDER
THE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/abduct2012cp_us.pdf [hereinafter
U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE]. The rules are codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. See
22 C.F.R. §§ 94.1−94.8 (2014).
18. Michael R. Walsh & Susan W. Savard, International Child Abduction & the
Hague Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 49−50 (2006).
19. Id. Proving the Article 20 “human rights and fundamental freedoms” exception
requires “clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
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Subsequently, most American states adopted the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”).20 Consistent with the
international Convention, the UCCJEA allows for the “recognition and
enforcement” of foreign child custody and visitation orders.21 The UCCJEA
serves to ensure that prior custody determinations complied with due
process and equal protection principles.22
After the Convention entered into force in the U.S., the U.S. State
Department began issuing annual reports indicating which Member States
were non-compliant in returning children there pursuant to the Convention.23
For example, the most recent report, issued in April 2014, indicated that
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras were “not compliant.”24 Additionally,
the Bahamas and Brazil were labeled as having demonstrated “patterns of
non-compliance.”25
One country that some suspect might exhibit similar patterns of noncompliance, now that it has ratified the Convention, is Japan.26 On May
20. See U.S. C OUNTRY P ROFILE , supra note 17; Unif. Child Custody and
Enforcement Act 9(1A) U.L.A. 657 (1997), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/child_custody_jurisdiction/uccjea_final_97.pdf.
21. According to the U.S., “In general, the [UCCJEA] provides a mechanism for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign custody orders by U.S. state courts, if the
foreign proceeding was done in substantial conformity with the provisions of the UCCJEA
governing due process. Additionally, within the United States, each U.S. state must give
full faith and credit to a civil protection order granted by another U.S. state. Thus, we believe
the current trend in the United States is for courts to recognize foreign orders of protection or,
where the order cannot be recognized directly, create a mirror order.” U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE,
supra note 17.
22. Id.
23. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULATE AFFAIRS, COMPLIANCE
INFORMATION , http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/legal/compliance.html,
for a collection of the reports. Mexico has been labeled as non-compliant or displaying
patterns of non-compliance every year since 1999. Id. One country that has also been
particularly problematic is Brazil, as evidenced by the 2008−2013 reports, all indicating
that Brazil either demonstrated patterns of non-compliance or was non-compliant. Id. The
U.S. had returned seven abducted children to Brazil pursuant to the Convention by 2010,
but Brazil did not send a single child back to the U.S. in a Convention proceeding until the
infamous case of a child named Sean Goldman in 2009, where international pressure and
threatened economic sanctions may have been the true cause of the decision. See Amanda
Michelle Waide, To Comply or Not to Comply? Brazil’s Relationship with the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 271, 295 (2010).
24. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULATE AFFAIRS, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE
WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
(2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2014.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE].
25. Id. The reasons for these particular States’ non-compliance will be discussed
below in further detail.
26. See Colin P.A. Jones, Hague Convention on Child Abduction May Shape Japan’s
Family Law, THE JAPAN TIMES (June 11, 2013), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/
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22, 2013, Japan solidified its intention to become a member to the
Convention by statutorily joining the treaty.27 Japan enacted the necessary
legislation to implement the Convention into domestic law on June 12,
2013.28 The Japanese government approved the promulgation of the
Convention on January 24, 2014, which then entered into force on April
1, 2014.29 Japan’s initial hesitation to becoming a signatory to the
Convention is partially rooted in its domestic family law system, which is
inconsistent with the goals and principles underlying the Convention.30
Another related factor is its claim that it needs to protect Japanese mothers
fleeing from domestic violence.31 These and other reasons, to be discussed
in further detail below, raise suspicion that Japanese courts may not fully
comply with the Convention or might inaccurately interpret its exceptions.
III. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALISTIC BIAS AND STRATEGIC
INTERPRETATION
The U.S. is a relatively old member of the Convention and frequently
upholds the treaty’s core principles by narrowly interpreting its exceptions.32
Contrarily, Japan is the newest signatory to the Convention and has
already provided several reasons to give other Member States concern
over its bona fide compliance.33 The basic problem is that the vague
language of the Article 12 and Article 13 exceptions allows Member States
to interject subjective bias into the enforcement process and evade the
Convention’s principles, rendering the treaty’s application inconsistent.
Although the U.S. often upholds the principles of the Convention by
returning children to their State of habitual residence, its courts have
2013/06/11/issues/hague-convention-on-child-abduction-may-shape-japans-family-law-or-viceversa/#.VAfF-PldXX5.
27. Overview of the Hague Convention and Related Japanese Legal Systems,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (June 2, 2014), http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/hr
_ha/page22e_000250.html.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Megan J. Reynolds, It Can Be Done: On Japan Becoming a Successful
Signatory to the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 44
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 367, 379−81 (2012).
31. Id. at 386−87.
32. See, e.g., Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069; Renovales v. Roosa, No. FA 91 0392232
S, 1991 WL 204483, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991); Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d
204, 218 (1st Cir. 2000); McManus v. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D. Mass. 2005).
33. See Jones, supra note 26.

215

ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

10/10/2016 3:27 PM

engaged in liberal interpretations of the Article 12 and 13 exceptions and,
at times, interjected nationalistic bias into the process.34 The risk of
subjective interpretation is particularly great with regard to the Article
13(b) defense, which is problematic because such defenses have been on
the rise globally and have remained the most common reason for a court
to refuse a child’s return.35
As for Japan, its domestic family law system seems to conflict with the
Convention’s principles. For instance, its failure to recognize joint
custody36 may often hinder, rather than further, the interests of children.
Moreover, its bias in favor of preserving maternal custody and Japanese
heritage37 may influence courts to avoid prompt return in many situations.
Japan’s hesitance to ratify the Convention and its willingness to act as a
safe haven for Japanese mothers38 also suggest that Japan may apply the
exceptions in an overly broad manner and, consequently, may not honor
foreign court judgments to compel child removal.
This problem of interpretation and judicial bias towards one’s own
country is not easily solved. Several possible solutions exist, such as
amending the Convention to narrow the language of the exceptions,
providing effective economic sanctions against non-compliant Member
States, or simply resorting to regional agreements rather than international
ones. However, current signatories would likely resist narrowing the
language of the exceptions; the current broad language is favored
because it provides a measure of discretion that expands the range of
justifications available to courts in denying a child’s return.39 As to
34. See, e.g., Krishna v. Krishna, No. C 97-0021 SC, 1997 WL 195439, at *4 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 11, 1997) (“It is clear from the evidence that the relationship between Mr. and
Ms. Krishna is a tempestuous one, which has caused considerable psychological stress to
both parents and child. Return of the child to Australia would only serve to reinstate the
child in a highly stressful and psychologically damaging environment, particularly
because Ms. Krishna has relatively limited familial support in Australia. Moreover, the
child is currently well settled in United States where a divorce proceeding has been filed
and can been expedited to minimize the costs to Mr. Krishna”).
35. NAT’L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, LITIGATING INT’L CHILD
ABDUCTION CASES UNDER THE CONVENTION 53 (2012) [hereinafter LITIGATING INT’L
CHILD ABDUCTION CASES]; HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, STATISTICAL
ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2008 UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25
OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION: PART I –
GLOBAL REPORT ¶¶ 107-109 (2011), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/
abduct2011pd08ae.pdf.
36. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380−81; Jennifer Costa, If Japan Signs the Hague
Convention on Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Real Change or Political
Maneuvering?, 12 OR. REV. INT’L L. 369, 376 (2010).
37. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84.
38. See id. at 386−87; Costa, supra note 36, at 371.
39. Consider that, in 2013, return was denied in fifty-seven Convention proceedings
worldwide, while return was ordered in one-hundred-four such proceedings. U.S. DEP’T
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sanctions, they tend to create hostility and may not address the problem
on a global level.40 In light of these considerations, the most effective and
enduring solution is a system where some degree of neutrality can be
achieved internationally and where all affected parties have the opportunity
to participate in structuring the result that will legally bind them in the
future.
A. The Problem of Exception Over-Breadth
1. U.S. Judicial Interpretation of the Article 13(b)
The American interpretation of Convention Article 13(b) is not easily
ascertainable because U.S. courts have applied a wide variety of approaches
in different circumstances.41 Overall, however, U.S. courts have most
often applied the exception narrowly.42 For instance, in the frequently
cited case of Friedrich v. Friedrich, the Sixth Circuit held that the Article
13(b) “grave risk of harm” exception does not allow courts in the country
to which the child was taken to engage in speculation on where the “child
would be happiest.”43 Rather, the exception can be properly applied only
in two situations: (1) where the child is at risk of imminent danger if
returned (meaning the child will be returned to circumstances of famine,
disease, or war); or (2) where “serious neglect, abuse, or extreme emotional
dependence” of the child is implicated if returned.44 In either scenario, for
the defense to be properly invoked, the courts in the State of habitual
residence must also be unable or unwilling to adequately protect the
child.45 A circuit split exists among U.S. federal courts as to whether the
OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULATE AFFAIRS, OUTGOING AND INCOMING CASE CLOSINGS
STATISTICS (2013), available at http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/statistics/

CY2013%20-%20Incoming%20and%20Outgoing%20Closing%20Statistics.pdf. Although
the Convention seems to be working more often than not, these statistics tend to show that
Member States are still denying return fairly often in cases in which they are supposedly
applying the Convention. See id.
40. For instance, economic sanctions may adversely affect vulnerable populations,
such as in third world countries. This may spark humanitarian concerns among
the international community. See UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sc/committees.
41. Compare Freidrich, 78 F.3d at 1069, with Krishna, 1997 WL 195439, at *4.
42. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069; Roosa, 1991 WL 204483, at *6; Walsh, 221
F.3d at 218; McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
43. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068.
44. Id. at 1069.
45. See id.
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Article 13(b) requires imminent danger or, alternatively, whether how far in
the future the alleged harm would occur is irrelevant.46
If the court in the country that the child is being returned to—the State
of habitual residence—can adequately remedy the situation, then the
Article 13(b) exception generally does not apply.47 Nonetheless, in 2008,
the Eleventh Circuit determined that an analysis of whether the State of
habitual residence can provide adequate protection is problematic.48 The
court ultimately held that the responding party had no duty to show the
inability or unwillingness of the country of habitual residence to adequately
protect the child in order to establish that a “grave risk of harm” would
result upon the child’s return.49
American courts generally refuse to grant exceptions to the Convention as
substitutes for the perceived best interests of the child.50 For instance, in
Renovales v. Roosa, a mother took her children from their habitual
residence in Spain to Connecticut, breaching the father’s custody rights,
in violation of the Convention.51 The mother invoked the Article 13(b)
“grave risk of harm” defense, alleging that one of the children suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) at least partially due to the
father’s controlling and hostile behavior, including force-feeding, screaming
at, and humiliating the child.52 The Connecticut Superior Court refused to
apply the exception, finding evidence of nothing more than “cultural
differences in family child rearing.”53 Consequently, the court ordered that
the child be immediately returned to Spain and held the mother liable for
both travel expenses and attorney’s fees.54
However, U.S. courts have refused to return a child pursuant to the
Convention in cases where there is concrete evidence of past physical
abuse by the parent to whom the child would be returned.55 For example,
in Danaipour v. McLarey, the First Circuit refused to send two sisters back
to their habitual residence in Sweden after the district court found that the
father sexually abused one of them.56 The court affirmed the district
court’s conclusion that a finding of sexual abuse of one daughter,

46. Compare Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005), with Walsh,
221 F.3d at 218.
47. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1069.
48. Baran v. Beaty, 526 F.3d 1340, 1348 (11th Cir. 2008).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Roosa, 1991 WL 204483, at *5.
51. Id. at *1.
52. Id. at *3−4.
53. Id. at *5.
54. Id. at *6.
55. See, e.g., Danaipour v. McLarey, 386 F.3d 289, 304 (1st Cir. 2004).
56. Id.
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combined with the resulting psychological harm to both daughters, was
sufficient to invoke the Article 13(b) defense.57 On the other hand, a
Massachusetts district court reached the opposite conclusion in McManus v.
McManus, where a mother seeking return of her children to Northern
Ireland faced an Article 13(b) defense on account of her harsh physical
discipline of the children, including striking them at least six times and
engaging her brother and friend to assist in physically disciplining them
twice.58 The court admitted that there was reason to believe that the
children would experience some degree of psychological harm if returned to
their mother’s care in Northern Ireland and even characterized the harm
as “serious.”59 However, the court observed that cases successfully invoking
the Article 13(b) defense in the past required evidence of a continuing
pattern of physical abuse, a high propensity for violence, or both.60
Conversely, “evidence of real but sporadic or isolated incidents of physical
abuse” had been insufficient to invoke the exception.61 Hence, despite the
children’s objection to return, the court found the facts insufficient for an
Article 13(b) defense.62
A more recent Seventh Circuit decision, Van de Sande v. Van de Sande,
held that the magnitude of the potential harm, and thus an assessment of
the nature of the harm, is a proper consideration in addition to the mere
likelihood that the harm will take place if the child is returned.63 That case
involved two children whose State of habitual residence was Belgium.64
The mother was living in the U.S. with the two children when the father
was awarded custody by a Belgian court, thus rendering the mother an
“abductor.”65 At trial, the mother presented several affidavits alleging that
the father abused her multiple times per week, including choking her,
pushing her down the stairs, kicking her at least once while she was
pregnant, and threatening to kill her and the children.66 The wife also
alleged that the father had used harsh physical punishment on the daughter
57. Id. at 302−03. It appears that sexual abuse is a bright line qualifier for Article
13(b) refusal of return. See id.
58. McManus, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 65, 70.
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id. at 70.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005).
64. Id. at 569.
65. Id.
66. Id.

219

ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

10/10/2016 3:27 PM

in the past.67 The Seventh Circuit concluded that “given [the father’s]
propensity for violence, and the grotesque disregard for the children’s
welfare that he displayed by beating his wife severely and repeatedly in
their presence and hurling obscene epithets at her also in their presence, it
would be irresponsible to think the risk to the children less than grave.”68
The court, noting the sufficiency of the evidence of grave risk of harm and
the questionable post-return conditions in Belgium, remanded for an
evidentiary hearing to explore those issues.69
By the same token, U.S. courts are more reluctant to invoke the Article
13(b) defense based on physical abuse where there are only bare allegations
as opposed to concrete evidence.70 For instance, in Munoz v. Ramirez,
despite the father’s allegations that his daughter was sexually abused by
her mother’s boyfriend, the court refused to invoke the “grave risk of harm”
defense because there was “no actual evidence” indicating that the mother’s
boyfriend had a history of child molestation or that he inappropriately
touched the daughter.71
Some courts alternatively considered a series of factors in the physical
abuse context to determine whether the “grave risk of harm” is sufficient
to invoke the Article 13(b) defense.72 An illustrative example is Simcox v.
Simcox, where the court considered the nature of the abuse, the frequency
with which the abuse occurred, and the probability that it would happen
again without adequate protection.73 In that case, the mother sought to
prevent her children’s return to their father in their State of habitual
residence, presenting evidence that he repeatedly beat them, hit them with a
belt, pulled their hair and ears, had angry outbursts, and abused the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 570.
69. Id. at 572. But see Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 719 (7th Cir. 2006) (ordering
the children’s return to their State of habitual residence in Germany where the father
abducted the children to the U.S. and displayed a similar pattern of abuse and threats
toward the mother, but on the sole basis that Germany was the habitual residence rather
than on Article 13(b) grounds, as the Article 13(b) defense was not raised).
70. Munoz v. Ramirez, 923 F. Supp. 2d 931, 955 (W.D. Tex. 2013); see also Jaet
v. Siso, No. 08–81232–CIV, 2009 WL 35270, at *7−8 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that
physically disciplining the child, while concerning, was insufficient to invoke the Article
13(b) defense because there was no evidence of child abuse beyond that purpose, and the
discipline could be partially accounted for by cultural differences in child upbringing, a
matter inappropriate for court interference); Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843,
850−51 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to invoke the Article 13(b) exception where the
mother offered a psychologist’s testimony indicating that the child had PTSD and probably
suffered from sexual, physical, and emotional abuse as well as child neglect, in the absence
of evidence that the father actually abused the child).
71. Munoz, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 955.
72. See, e.g., Simcox v. Simcox, 511 F.3d 594, 609 (6th Cir. 2007).
73. Id. at 608.
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mother in their presence.74 Because the nature of the harm was “serious,”
occurred with “extreme frequency,” and was reasonably likely to happen
again without protection, the court concluded that the mother established
her burden of proving a grave risk of harm by clear and convincing
evidence. 75
It is relatively common for U.S. courts interpreting Article 13(b) of the
Convention to require proof of specificity.76 For instance, successfully
opposing a child’s return typically requires showing the specific potential
harm that will be endured by that child, not someone else.77 However,
some courts have applied a more liberal standard of proof in determining
whether the alleged harm would affect a specific child as opposed to a
parent or someone else.78 For example, in In re Krishna v. Krishna, the
mother took the child from Australia to the U.S. in violation of the
Convention.79 She later raised an Article 13(b) defense alleging that the
father physically abused her, but never the child, in the past.80 The court
held that the mother could properly invoke the defense because although
physical harm was unlikely, there was “compelling evidence establishing the
potential for serious psychological harm” in light of the history of alleged
abuse and the hostile relationship between the parents.81
Several past decisions in U.S. courts indicate a willingness to consider
the fact that a child is settled into his or her new environment in deciding
whether a “grave risk of harm” is sufficiently grave to deny the return of

74. Id.
75. Id. at 609.
76. See, e.g., Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1067−68.
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., Krishna, 1997 WL 195439, at *4.
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *1, *4. This liberal standard appears to be out of line with American
courts’ general approach. See Croll v. Croll, 66 F. Supp. 2d 555, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“The cases applying the Hague Convention make manifest that the Article 13 exception
is only applicable when the child, as opposed to a parent, would be placed in danger if she
were returned”).
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the child.82 However, mere adjustment problems are generally inadequate.83
Presumably, then, most American courts in the Article 13(b) context would
not be swayed by arguments that the child being returned would have to
bear the burden of attending a new school, meeting new friends, or
learning a new language.84
At least one U.S. court has considered the potential effect that separation
from his or her parent(s) would have on the child.85 However, in light of
inconsistent precedents, it remains unclear whether a court today would
consider a strong parent-child bond sufficient to invoke the Article 13(b)
defense or, alternatively, whether it would leave resolution of the issue to
the courts of the child’s State of habitual residence.86 While some courts
have determined that it is appropriate to weigh a child’s objection to being
returned in evaluating the Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” defense,87
others have rejected such an approach.88
82. See Blondin v. Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 153 (2d Cir. 2001); Tsarbopoulos v.
Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1059 (E.D. Wash. 2001). Those courts appear to be
fusing the Article 12 “settled into new environment” exception and the 13(b) “grave risk
of harm” exception into one. See id. However, there is no indication in the language of the
Convention that how well a child is settled in his or her new environment (Article 12) has
anything to do with establishing a “grave risk of harm” for Article 13(b) purposes. See
Convention, supra note 1, at arts. 12, 13(b).
83. See Morrison v. Dietz, Civil Action No. 07–1398, 2008 WL 4280030, at *13
(W.D. La. 2008), aff’d on other grounds, 349 F. App’x 930 (5th Cir. 2009); Friedrich, 78
F.3d at 1068 (“Under the logic of the Convention, it is the abduction that causes the pangs
of the subsequent return”).
84. The “habitual residence” dynamic should reduce the raising of such arguments
because children are returned to the State where they originally lived before the abduction.
However, in some cases, the child may be present in the abducted-to nation for long
enough to establish a comfortable life there, inclusive of school, friends, and culture. As a
result, the child may face adaptation-related problems upon return.
85. See Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d at 1061−62 (refusing to return the children
to their habitual residence in Greece where the mother was one child’s primary caregiver
for nearly his entire life, that child had a strong bond with his siblings, and the mother
could not return to Greece due to inadequate resources). But see Charalambous v.
Charalambous, 627 F.3d 462, 469−70 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that the effect on the child
of separation from the mother is an issue properly left to the courts of the State of habitual
residence); Jaet, 2009 WL 35270, at *8 (holding that although the children were so
attached to their mother that separation would probably result in severe psychological
harm, the Article 13(b) defense failed due to the absence of legal authority compelling a
return under the particular facts of the case).
86. Case law is inconsistent on this issue. Compare Tsarbopoulos, 176 F. Supp. 2d
at 1061−62, with Charalambous, 627 F.3d at 469−70, and Siso, 2009 WL 35270, at *8.
87. See, e.g., Kofler v. Kofler, Civil No. 07-5040, 2007 WL 2081712, at *8−9
(W.D. Ark. 2007).
88. See, e.g., Kufner v. Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d 491, 512−13 (D.R.I. 2007) (refusing to
consider children’s inconsistent wishes in assessing “grave risk of harm” because of the
possibility that their parents unduly influenced them, especially considering the children’s
youth and immaturity).
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As for the “grave risk that [the] return would . . . otherwise place the child
in an intolerable situation,”89 the court in Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch
concluded that a country’s “civil stability” was insufficient.90 Although
Argentina, the State of habitual residence in that case, was experiencing
extremely difficult financial times and government chaos, the court
determined that the circumstances of return were nonetheless tolerable
because the neighborhoods and schools surrounding the child’s prospective
home were not dangerously affected.91 In such situations, where the
perceived harm is more likely to affect to the general population as opposed
to a particular child, courts have considered at least three additional factors in
evaluating whether a “grave risk of harm” exists: (1) whether terrorist
attacks or other violent activities substantially disrupted life in the State
of habitual residence;92 (2) whether, prior to the abduction, the child faced
the harm complained of and the parents failed to act to remove the child
from the situation;93 and (3) whether mitigating measures exist.94
In sum, the clear disjunction among U.S. courts in evaluating Article
13(b) defense claims illuminates the broader problem of inconsistent
interpretations of the Convention’s exceptions. Surely, if courts within a
single country arrive at such varied conclusions about how and when to
apply the Article 13(b) exception, uniformity at the international level is
virtually unattainable. Indeed, internationally, courts exhibit stark
inconsistency. 95

89. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 13(b) (emphasis added).
90. Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364−65 (M.D. Fla.
2002).
91. Id.
92. See Frier v. Frier, 969 F. Supp. 436, 443 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
93. See Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriguez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 614 (E.D. Va. 2002).
94. See Walsh, 221 F.3d at 218.
95. For instance, as previously noted, Brazil has been reported as demonstrating
patterns of non-compliance with the Convention in recent years. In 2009, the U.S. State
Department reported that Brazil had a tendency to treat Convention cases as custody
determinations and deny applications for return based on the fact that the child in question
had either become settled in his or her environment or adapted to the culture in Brazil, or
both. See COMPLIANCE INFORMATION, supra note 23. These justifications are generally
inconsistent with U.S. judicial interpretations the Convention. See Freidrich, 78 F.3d at
1069; Charalambous, 627 F.3d at 469−70; Jaet, 2009 WL 35270, at *8.

223

ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

10/10/2016 3:27 PM

2. Japan’s Prospective Interpretation of the Article 13(b) Exception
Japan only very recently gained official Convention signatory status,
thus it is not surprising that, among the estimated 300 children abducted
there from the U.S. between 1994 and 2013, the U.S. government—as of
2013—did not know of a single example of a Japanese court granting
favorable relief to a left-behind, American parent.96 In 2009, an estimated
10,000 children in Japan were denied a relationship with their non-Japanese
parent after a separation or divorce.97 That same year, U.S. citizens were
involved in approximately 80 cases of international parental child abduction
to Japan.98 Moreover, between 2007 and 2009, the number of cases of
parental kidnapping in Japan practically doubled.99 In 2011, there were 100
active cases of child abduction or wrongful retention of American children in
Japan, involving a total of 140 children.100
In light of these statistics, the U.S. and several other nations ultimately
resorted to international pressure to secure Japan’s ratification of the
Convention. However, it is unclear that Japan will now comply with the
Convention. There are multiple reasons to suspect that Japan will
demonstrate the same tendency as many current Member States: to
interpret the Convention’s exceptions—particularly Article 13(b)—in an
overly broad and inherently biased manner. As stated above, Japanese
domestic family law strongly disfavors joint custody101 and thus conflicts
with the Convention’s principles regarding custody rights and the interests of
children. Further, Japanese courts often exhibit bias in favor of mothers or
preserving Japanese heritage,102 which their future Convention decisions may
wrongfully reflect. Finally, Japan seeks to protect female citizens returning
there to escape domestic violence,103 which raises some concern that its
courts will interpret the Article 13(b) exception too broadly.

96. H. Rep. Chris Smith, Remarks at the 2172 Rayburn House Office Building:
Resolving International Parental Child Abductions to Non-Hague Convention Countries
(May 9, 2013), available at http://chrissmith.house.gov/uploadedfiles/2013-05-09_chairman
_smith_on_resolving_international_parental_child_abductions_to_non-hague_convention_
countries_on_letterhead.pdf; Reynolds, supra note 30, at 367−68.
97. Justin McCurry, Savoie’s Choice: Abduct or Fight?, GLOBAL POST (Oct. 27,
2009, 6:45 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/japan/091026/child-abductions-japan.
98. Id.
99. Michelle Boykin, A Comparison of Japanese and Moroccan Approaches in
Adopting the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 46
FAM. L.Q. 451, 455 (2012).
100. Id; Reynolds, supra note 30, at 378.
101. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380; Costa, supra note 36, at 376.
102. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84.
103. Id. at 386−87; Costa, supra note 36, at 371.
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a. Japanese Domestic Family Law and Family Court System
First of all, Japanese domestic law does not closely align with the
Convention’s stated principles.104 Family law in Japan is based on the
“koseki” system.105 Upon marriage, every couple obtains a household
registry (or a “koseki”) that establishes the legal status of the family and
governs the relationships of the family unit.106 If a husband and wife
divorce, the system provides that any children of the marriage are assigned
exclusively to one side of the family or the other.107 Unlike most Member
States’ legal systems, the Japanese system “simply has no mechanism for
sharing children between two families.”108
Similarly, under Japan’s Civil Code, there are two types of child custody:
“shinken” and “kangoken.”109 While “shinken” can be fairly equated with
legal custody, “kangoken” approximates physical custody.110 Both parents
exercise “shinken,” of which “kangoken” is a component, over their minor
children so long as the parents are married.111 However, if they divorce,
“shinken” and “kangoken” are almost certain to remain together and be
awarded to one parent, effectively limiting the exercise of legal parental
authority to that parent only.112 A parent who earns sole custody in Japan
essentially obtains “exclusive decision making authority over all aspects
of the child’s life, including where the child will live and go to school and

104. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380; Costa, supra note 36, at 376; Jane
Kitagawa, Left Behind: Parents Challenge Japan’s Dismal Child Abduction Laws,
METROPOLIS (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/
2014/01/left-behind-parents-challenge-japans.html (“[Japan’s] divorce figures may be
consistent with rates worldwide, but Japan is unique in that child abduction after separation or
divorce is legal according to its family court.” As for Japan’s ratification of the Convention,
“[t]here are also doubts among left-behind parents, lawyers and others alike that not much
will change unless domestic laws are also addressed”). Id.
105. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 379−80.
106. Id. at 380.
107. Id.
108. G. M. Filisko, When Global Families Fail, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2010), http://www.
abajournal.com/magazine/article/when_global_families_fail/.
109. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 380−81; Colin P.A. Jones, Towards an “Asian” Child Abduction
Treaty? Some Observations on Singapore and Japan Joining the Hague Convention 11
(Asian Law Inst., Working Paper No. 031, 2013), available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/asli/
pdf/WPS031.pdf.
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even whether the other parent will be excluded from their life.”113 Not only
are joint and partial custody arrangements not legally recognized in Japan,114
but courts award sole custody to the mother at the expense of the father
about 80% of the time.115 Although there is evidence suggesting the public
attitude in Japan regarding family law and the best interests of the child
may be changing in favor of joint post-divorce parental involvement,116
there is no practical way to infuse those values within the judiciary.117
Further, the judiciary has shown no signs of such adaptation thus far.118
The Japanese court system may also present some difficulties; most family
law in Japan is created judicially rather than statutorily, thus it is very
unlikely for a foreign parent, even with proof of a pre-existing custody
order, to receive a favorable ruling from a Japanese judge.119
113. Jones, supra note 112, at 11.
114. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380.
115. Kamoto Itsuku, Behind Japan’s Ratification of the Hague Abduction Convention,
NIPPON.COM (June 14, 2013), http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00079/.
116. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 386; Lawmakers Launch Group to Ensure
Visitations After Divorce, KYODO NEWS INTERNATIONAL (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.
globalpost.com/dispatch/news/kyodo-news-international/140318/lawmakers-launch-groupensure-visitations-after-divorc (reporting that Japanese lawmakers arranged a meeting
with the goal of enacting legislation to improve post-divorce visitation rights between
children and parents).
117. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 381. Another potential concern is that Japanese family court orders are
known for their general lack of enforceability due to judicial discretion to not enforce
judgments, among other limitations. Id. at 381−82; see also Colin P.A. Jones, In the Best
Interests of the Court: What American Lawyers Need to Know About Child Custody and
Visitation in Japan, 8 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 166, 177 (2007) (noting that Japanese
judges have “no court marshals with police-like powers to carry out their orders,” and have
limited ability to hold parties in contempt of court). Even in the limited situations in which
judges have enforcement mechanisms available to them, they “may not care whether this
result is achieved” and often take advantage of their discretionary power to refuse
enforcement. Id; see also Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382. Japan’s legislation to implement
the Convention reflects the traditional unenforceability problem, as it “contains extensive
provisions for enforcement of a return order.” Jeremy D. Morley, Japan and the Hague
Abduction Convention: Implementation and Practical Effects, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW
FIRM (June 11, 2014, 1:36 PM), http://www.internationalfamilylawfirm.com/search? updatedmax=2014-07-03T12:19:00-07:00&max-results=20&start=13&by-date=false.
These
legislative enforcement mechanisms will at least give Japanese courts deciding Convention
cases a starting point in the “unprecedented” realm of enforceable family court orders;
however, as one commentator suggests, “[t]ime will tell whether they prove to be effective.”
Id. If Japan’s enforcement provisions prove successful, then it is of even greater concern
that its courts tend to grant sole custody arrangements in favor of mothers and Japanese
citizens at the expense of fathers and foreign parents. Contrarily, even if enforceability
remains weak, the need to bring Japan into compliance through a neutral process persists. As
discussed above, the Convention primarily serves to return children to their States of
habitual residence, which, by implication, necessitates an enforceable court order. Inevitably,
Japanese courts will enforce Convention return orders to some extent, lest the international
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Finally, Japanese courts often demonstrate bias in family court
proceedings, both in favor of a mother over a father and in favor of a
Japanese parent over a foreign parent.120 Taimie L. Bryant’s research in
the 1980s and 1990s illustrates the motive to preserve Japanese identity.121 In
Bryant’s initial study—between 1981 and 1984—of family court
mediation proceedings122 involving a Japanese parent and a foreign
parent, she observed that every decision entailed “elaborate provisions to
protect the [child’s] Japanese identity at the expense of [his or her] nonJapanese identity.”123 While the Japanese parent usually won the custody
battle, the non-Japanese parent won only in limited circumstances where
he or she agreed to raise the child with an exclusively Japanese identity.124
For instance, the foreign parent could agree to a condition that “in the
event of remarriage to a non-Japanese or relocation outside of Japan, there
would be another round of mediation to reassess custody.”125 In her
second study in 1992, Bryant found that although non-Japanese mothers
were awarded custody more often than before, factors such as which
parent was more familiar with the Japanese language or which would be
more likely to raise the child with a Japanese identity almost always
factored into the decision.126 Moreover, not a single actor in the mediation
proceedings ever mentioned the possibility of “bicultural identity” or
“blended families” with regard to the environment in which the child
would mature after the parents’ divorce.127
As discussed above, Japan does not recognize joint custody and
usually grants sole custody to the mother.128 This precedential pattern may
limit Convention-return proceedings. For instance, if a mother were to
wrongfully abduct and retain her child in Japan in violation of the
Convention, it would be difficult to imagine a Japanese judge dispensing

pressure overwhelm them, and Japan’s detailed provisions written for that purpose likely
indicate that they will at least try.
120. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84.
121. Taimie L. Bryant, Family Models, Family Dispute Resolution and Family Law
in Japan, 14 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 18−19 (1995).
122. Mediation is required before parties can litigate most family law disputes in
Japan. Id. at 2.
123. Id. at 18.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 18 n.43.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id.
128. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380, 382−83.
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with her arguments and promptly returning the child to his or her father in
the State of habitual residence. Notably, the Convention defines a
violation of the treaty as a breach of the rights of custody of the left-behind
parent.129 This definition seems to presume that the left-behind parent is
capable of having legal custody rights over the child.
This presumption is generally true in Convention proceedings.130 For
example, in the U.S., joint custody arrangements are increasingly
preferred.131 Some American states have statutory presumptions in favor
of joint custody, in which case the parents share equal legal rights over the
child after divorce, rebuttable only by a showing of legitimate
justification for why the arrangement is inappropriate.132 As for the states
that do not explicitly delineate such presumptions, statutes affecting
custody have been revised to reflect new cultural preferences in favor of
dual-parent involvement after divorce, and traditional presumptions
favoring maternal custody have been largely eliminated.133 Likewise, many
other Member States are moving towards a post-divorce presumption in
favor of joint custody.134
However, in Japan, where joint custody is neither culturally embedded
nor evident in judicial decisions,135 a court would likely struggle to
recognize the validity of left-behind parents’ joint custody rights. Such
hesitation would be even more likely if the left-behind parent happened to
be a non-Japanese father, as discussed above.136 Finally, in light of studies
showing that Japanese judges and mediators often consider the
preservation of national identity as an important factor in their decisions,137 it
seems likely that Japan will be particularly hesitant in promptly returning
children to their State of habitual residence in compliance with the
Convention. This remains a problem for both mothers and fathers whose
children have been wrongfully abducted to Japan. Even if a Japanese court
129. Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3.
130. See, e.g., Israel’s Justice Minister: Divorced Parents Must Share Custody of
Children, HAARETZ.COM (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-sjustice-minister-divorced-parents-must-share-custody-of-children-1.408169 (reporting that the
Israeli Justice Minister announced his intention to adopt public committee recommendations to
overturn the presumption of maternal custody of young children after divorce).
131. Bernardo Cuadra, Family Law—Maternal and Joint Custody Presumptions for
Unmarried Parents: Constitutional and Policy Considerations in Massachusetts and Beyond,
32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 599, 599 (2010).
132. Id. at 600.
133. Id. at 599.
134. Additional examples include France, Belgium, Spain, and Australia. Love
Before the Law: Child Custody Set for Overhaul, THE LOCAL: GERMANY’S NEWS IN
ENGLISH (July 2, 2010, 11:34 AM), http://www.thelocal.de/20100702/28199.
135. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 380−81; Costa, supra note 36, at 376.
136. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 381−83.
137. See id. at 383−84; Bryant, supra note 121, at 18−19.
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were not faced with the issue of maternal bias, cultural bias favoring Japanese
identity could interfere with the Convention’s terms and intent.
For these reasons, Japan’s current system of family law may be
irreconcilable with the treaty it just ratified and now, presumably, seeks to
enforce. While the Convention is grounded in “widely-accepted notions
of what is in the best interests of the child,” family law in Japan largely
draws on “consensual arrangements in which the government provides a
largely administrative function . . . without any supervision over the welfare
of the child affected by them.”138 Although views on post-divorce
visitation are changing in Japan,139 Japanese courts still believe that
visitation by the non-custodial parent is burdensome to the child and,
consequently, award visitation rights only when they expire within a short
period.140
The view of Japanese courts that the interests of children are best served
by granting sole custody to one parent while denying visitation to the other
stands in stark contrast with the views held by the judiciaries of other
Member States, which generally believe children are better off having both
parents in their lives. 141 Japan’s historical approach may limit
enforcement of the Convention as intended, particularly in light of the role
of “undertakings” in Convention-return proceedings,142 which could
theoretically establish visitation rights as a condition of the child’s
return.143 If Japanese courts do not consider such an undertaking to be in
138. Jones, supra note 112, at 25.
139. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 386; Lawmakers Launch Group to Ensure
Visitations, supra note 116.
140. Boykin, supra note 99, at 460.
141. See Love Before the Law, supra note 134.
142. Undertakings are positive or negative conditions imposed by judges governing
the relationships among the parties during the transition period until the State of habitual
residence can determine the child’s safety, welfare, custody, and other similar issues. See
Mairead Britton, Undertakings: Satisfactory Safeguard to Grave Risk?, CORK ONLINE
LAW REVIEW, http://corkonlinelawreview.com/editions/2003/2003xi.pdf (citing P v. B [1994]
3 IR 507).
143. Undertakings cover a wide range of issues and may include protective orders,
orders to provide temporary financial assistance, or “promises designed to minimize
emotional trauma to a child threatened with separation from a primary caretaker.” Hon.
James D. Gorbolino, The 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction: A Guide for Judges, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (2012), at 101, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/hagueguide.pdf/$file/hagueguide.pdf. Presumably,
post-return visitation arrangements between a child and his or her parent could fall within
the scope of “promises designed to minimize emotional trauma to a child threatened with
separation from a primary caretaker.”
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the best interests of the child, they may decide to refuse return altogether
and subsequently use the Convention’s “interests of the child” language
to justify their decision.
American and Japanese courts may apply distinct interpretations of
certain specific language of the Convention. For example, an American
court would likely interpret the “interests of the child” provision as
requiring a child’s return to his or her State of habitual residence on the
assumption that its courts are better suited to make determinations affecting
the child’s welfare. However, a Japanese court would likely interpret the
same provision as giving it the discretion to refuse a child’s return, as
doing so would contradict its policy of minimizing changes in custody
arrangements and limiting decisions regarding assigning the child to a
single parent. If the Convention is really founded on furthering the interests
of children, as it claims to be, then Japan’s assessment of what “interests
of the child” means may be irreconcilable with other Member States’
interpretations.
b. Japan’s Motive to Protect Female Citizens from Domestic Violence
Another major reason to presume that the Japanese judiciary will construe
the Article 13(b) exception broadly and subjectively is the Japanese
government’s desire to protect women fleeing from domestic abuse, which it
articulated prior to its decision to ratify the Convention.144 The U.S.
government does not recognize Japan’s domestic violence apprehension
as a valid concern and certainly not as a legitimate justification for
circumventing the Convention.145 The U.S. State Department noted that it
has not found a significant number of cases involving actual domestic
violence between parents and, in many cases, it found that the allegations of
domestic violence were largely unsubstantiated.146
However, of the nine Convention cases decided by U.S. Courts of
Appeals between July 2000 and January 2001, seven involved mothers
who abducted their child(ren) on the basis of alleged domestic violence.147
This illustrates that domestic abuse is actually a relatively common issue
that arises in connection with Article 13(b) situations, and it certainly
cannot be said that American courts are unfamiliar with it. Regardless of
the official U.S. perspective, it is commonsensical that a genuine situation
of domestic violence can pose a “grave risk of harm” to a child returned
144. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 386−87.
145. Costa, supra note 36, at 371−72.
146. Id.
147. Merle H. Weiner, Navigating the Road Between Uniformity and Progress: The Need
for Purposive Analysis of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 277 (2002).
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to such circumstances. U.S. courts have recognized this148 and have
recently moved toward allowing the Article 13(b) defense in cases of
domestic abuse overall.149 Moreover, the Sixth Meeting of the Special
Commission to Review the Operation of the Convention concluded that
the consideration of domestic violence is properly within any application
of Article 13(b).150
Many other Convention signatories have considered the issue of
allegations of inappropriate behavior or sexual abuse in the Article 13(b)
context.151 The accusations were dismissed as unfounded in certain cases
in Belgium,152 Canada,153 France,154 New Zealand,155 and Switzerland,156
illustrating the straightforward approach taken by many Member States.
However, where the accusations are not unfounded, courts are divided
over “whether a detailed investigation should be undertaken in the State
of refuge, or . . . the State of habitual residence, with interim measures
being taken to attempt to protect the child on his return.”157 In cases in the

148. See, e.g., Van de Sande v. Van de Sande, 431 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2005).
149. Jeremy D. Morley, The Future of the Grave Risk of Harm Defense in Hague
Cases, THE LAW OFFICE OF JEREMY D. MORLEY: INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW, http://www.
international-divorce.com/grave_risk_harm_defense.htm.
150. H AGUE CONFERENCE ON P RIVATE INT ’ L LAW , C ONCLUSIONS AND
R ECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORT OF PART I OF THE SIXTH MEETING OF THE SPECIAL
COMM’N ON THE PRACTICAL OPERATION OF THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION CONVENTION
AND THE 1996 CHILD PROT. CONVENTION ¶ 129 (2011), available at http://www.hcch.
net/upload/wop/abduct2012pd14e.pdf.
151. See generally HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CASE LAW
ANALYSIS, http://www.incadat.com/index.cfm?act=analysis.show&sl=3&lng=1 (follow
“Exceptions to Return” hyperlink; then follow “Grave Risk of Harm” hyperlink; then
follow “Analysis of Inappropriate Behaviour / Sexual Abuse” hyperlink).
152. Tribunal de Première Instance [Civ.] [Tribunal of First Instance] Civ Liège, Réf,
March 14, 2002, REVUE TRIMESTRILLE DE DROIT FAMILILAL [Rev.trim.dr.fam] 2003, 398
(Belg.).
153. Droit de la Famille - 2675 (1997) (Can.); J.M. c. H.A., Droit de la Famille - 08497,
(2008) (Can.).
154. Cour d’appel [CA] [regional courts of appeal] 3eme chamber de la famille,
March 4, 1998, 5704759 (Fr.).
155. Wolfe v. Wolfe [1993] NZFLR 277 (N.Z.).
156. Obergericht des Kantons Zürich [Appellate Court of the Canton Zurich], Jan.
28, 1997, U/NL960145/II.ZK, (Switz.).
157. CASE LAW ANALYSIS, supra note 151.
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United Kingdom,158 Finland,159 and Ireland,160 the courts ordered return
with mandatory investigation in the State of habitual residence, whereas
courts in China161 and the U.S.162 ordered return with a mandatory
investigation in the State of refuge. However, some United Kingdom163
and U.S.164 courts refused return altogether. This variation in outcomes
among Member States applying the Article 13(b) defense to domestic
violence situations is alarming because many of these States have cultural
and legal similarities and have been Convention signatories for many
years.165 There is certainly no reason to believe that Japan will be an
exception to this trend of decisional inconsistency in light of Japan’s
clearly expressed concern about protecting victims of domestic abuse.166
It is more likely that Japan’s Convention decisions will fall closer to the
“refusal of return” end of the spectrum than the “dismissal of accusations”
end.
The fact that Member nations have varying interpretations of domestic
violence likely strengthened Japan’s initial hesitation to join the treaty.167 If
Japan views domestic violence more broadly than the U.S. and other
Member States, then Japanese courts will likely apply a more expansive
Article 13(b) interpretation than other States would think necessary to
ensure the safety of children. For instance, Japanese courts might deny a
child’s return on the basis of a “grave risk of harm” where there are only
bare allegations of abuse and minimal concrete supporting evidence, or

158. N. v. N. (Abduction: Article 13 Defence) [1995] EWHC (Fam) 116, 1 FLR 107
(Eng.).
159. Supreme Court of Finland [1996] 151, S96/2489.
160. A.S. v. P.S. (Child Abduction), [1998] 2 I.R. 244, (Superior Appellate Court)
(Ir.).
161. D. v. G., 1179 HKCU 1 (Appellate Court 2001) (China).
162. Danaipour v. McLarey, 286 F.3d 1, 26 (1st Cir. 2002); Kufner, 480 F. Supp. 2d
at 516.
163. Q., Petitioner (2001) S.L.T. 243 (Scot.).
164. Danaipour, 386 F.3d at 303.
165. For example, Canada ratified the Convention on June 29, 1983. STATUS TABLE,
supra note 2. Canada and the U.S. both have common law legal systems, which emphasize
“judicial independence as a prerequisite to justice.” Selina Koonar, Justice Systems in
Canada and the United States, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, BUSINESS LAW SECTION:
YOUNG LAWYER FORUM NEWSLETTER (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/10_summer
_ lit_feat1.html. Canada’s legal system has even borrowed American case law for precedential
value in certain areas of Canadian law that lack sufficient precedents, such as privacy
rights. Id.
166. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 369−70.
167. See Costa, supra note 36, at 371−72.
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where the prospective abuse, if actuated, would endanger someone other
than the child.168
Consequently, the Convention’s primary goal of promptly returning
children to their State of habitual residence would often be circumvented
in a way that the U.S. and many other States would find wrongful or noncompliant. In any case, the courts of the State of habitual residence should
be the ones making these types of determinations if they are to uphold the
spirit of the Convention. Scholars have emphasized that Article 13(b) is not
an automatic bar to the return of a child in the context of domestic abuse
allegations; rather, it is suggested that a proper application should include
consideration of evidence regarding the returned-to State’s ability to protect
the child.169
B. Difficulties Arising from Japan’s Implementing Legislation
Another reason to question Japan’s likely enforcement of the Convention
is because of the details specified in its implementing legislation, “The
Act in Connection with the Implementation of the Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction” (“the Act”).170 The Act
contains 153 articles, exclusive of the rules that the Japanese Supreme
Court will eventually provide to further outline the procedures under the
Convention.171 Under Articles 119 and 120 of the Act, a losing party is
allowed to apply for retrial after exhausting appeals opportunities, a process
that some criticize as “inconsistent with the Convention mandate that
return cases be handled expeditiously.”172
Another aspect of the Act that may present problems for petitioning
parties is its provision for court-directed mediation of Convention disputes.
168. Alternatively, as previously discussed, U.S. courts today would likely require
concrete evidence and proof of specificity. Thus, an issue of inconsistent interpretation arises.
169. See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 389 (citing Julie Alanen, When Human Rights
Conflict: Mediating International Parental Kidnapping Disputes Involving the Domestic
Violence Defense, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 49, 73 (2008)).
170. “Act for Implementation of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction” (tentative translation), Act No. 48 of 2013 (Japan), available at www.
hcch.net/upload/abduct_impl_act_jp.pdf [hereinafter the Act].
171. Id; Jones, supra note 112, at 22.
172. Jones, supra note 112, at 23. Further, Articles 122 and 123 authorize the court
in a return case to prohibit an abducted child’s removal from Japan. However, Japanese
courts never claimed such express authority before deciding to ratify the Convention, so
this provision may raise suspicion regarding Japan’s intentions to strictly comply with the
Convention’s mandates. See id.

233

ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

10/10/2016 3:27 PM

Pursuant to Article 144 of the Act, a court “with the consent of the parties, by
its own authority, may refer the case seeking the return of the child to the
conciliation of domestic relations at any time.”173 Under Article 145, any
agreement reached through such conciliation “shall have the same effect
as a final order to order the return of the child that has become final and
binding.”174 Further, Article 146 allows the court to suspend the
Convention proceedings until the conciliation is complete,175 and Article
147 provides that, when conciliation concludes, “it shall be deemed that
the petition for the case seeking return of child has been withdrawn.”176
One concern arising from these articles is that Japanese judges frequently
have various means of promoting agreement between the parties; “[i]f this
results in return cases being funneled into the same sort of mediation
already used in domestic custody cases and held before mediators who
must be Japanese nationals, it may not be good thing for a non-Japanese
parents.”177 Moreover, the Act does not clearly delineate the process of
reactivating a Convention case if mediation discussions become deadlocked,
which may place foreign parents at an even greater disadvantage.178
More importantly, Article 28(1)(iv) of the Act serves to replicate the
Article 13(b) “grave risk of harm” exception of the Convention, but Article
28(2) gives the Court discretion to consider a wide range of factors in
determining whether the exception applies.179 Judges may look to the risk

173. The Act, supra note 170, at art. 144.
174. Id. at art. 145.
175. Id. at art 146.
176. Id. at art. 147.
177. Jones, supra note 26.
178. Id. While there are strong justifications for favoring mediation over other legal
processes, there is significant evidence indicating the inadequacy of Japan’s current family law
mediation system. Mediation is required before litigation of most family law disputes in
Japan, but the mediation “perpetuates the ideal of having one family model within Japanese
society.” See Bryant, supra note 121, at 2. Private mediation services are lacking, putting a
tremendous burden on the public system. Id. at 9. As a result, “the qualifications, training, and
perspectives of the mediators cannot help but influence the role of family court mediation
in shaping the concepts of the family.” Id. Thus, allowing Japan’s mediators to determine postConvention-return conditions will fail to address the root of the problem. Japanese
mediators would likely display the same biases as Japanese courts, and foreign nations
would lack the incentive that they would have if assured of a neutral mediation process.
179. Jones, supra note 112, at 24. The full text of Article 28(2) reads: “The court,
when judging whether or not the grounds listed in item (iv) of the preceding paragraph
exist, shall consider all circumstances such as those listed below: (i) Whether or not there
is a risk that the child would be subject to the words and deeds, such as physical violence,
which would cause physical or psychological harm (referred to as “violence, etc.” in the
following item) by the petitioner, in the state of habitual residence; (ii) Whether or not there is
a risk that the respondent would be subject to violence, etc. by the petitioner in such a
manner as to cause psychological harm to the child, if the respondent and the child entered
into the state of habitual residence; (iii) Whether or not there are circumstances that make it
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of violence, which includes verbal violence, towards either the taking parent
or the child if he or she were to be returned.180 Judges may also consider
the presence of circumstances that might hinder the ability of the taking
parent or requesting parent to care for the child after the child’s return, which,
as one author has suggested, is effectively “authorizing something close
to an evaluation of both parents’ custodial capacities” in violation of
Article 19 of the Convention.181
Article 28 of the Act is particularly problematic, as it shows that the
Japanese government was likely using its implementing legislation to
circumvent the intent of the Convention even before officially ratifying it.
Furthermore, Japan is explicitly broadening the scope of the Article 13(b)
exception beyond what other States interpret the proper scope to be. Pursuant
to the language of the Act, a Japanese court deciding a Convention case must
consider whether there is a risk that the child would be subject to “words
and deeds” (subsequently referred to as “violence, etc.”) that would cause
physical or psychological harm upon the child’s return to the State of
habitual residence.182 Courts must also consider whether the respondent
would be subject to “violence, etc.” by the petitioning parent in a way that
would cause psychological harm to the child if the respondent and child were
both to return to the State of habitual residence.183 Finally, a court must
consider whether any circumstances exist that would make it difficult for
either parent to care for the child in the State of habitual residence.184
Under Japan’s intended scheme, a foreign parent could presumably risk
losing his or her children to the Japanese abductor-parent merely because
the foreign parent might raise his or her voice at a child, or even the
Japanese parent, in a way that would constitute verbal violence.185
Moreover, a court could potentially deny a child’s return to the foreign,
left-behind parent on the sole ground that the foreign parent is going
through financial difficulties and thus may experience some hardship due

difficult for the petitioner or the respondent to provide care for the child in the state of
habitual residence.” The Act, supra note 170, art. 28(2).
180. Jones, supra note 112, at 24.
181. Id. at 24−25.
182. The Act, supra note 170, at art. 28(2)(i).
183. Id. at art. 28(2)(ii).
184. Id. at art. 28(2)(iii).
185. See id. at art. 28(2)(i) (referring to “the words and deeds . . . which would cause
physical or psychological harm” (emphasis added); id. at art. 28(2)(ii).
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to the additional expenses of raising a child.186 Granted, the interpretation
would be entirely within the discretion of the Japanese court. Taken as a
whole, these legislative provisions enacted by Japan to implement the
Convention into domestic law tend to render some suspicion regarding its
prospective compliance.187
C. Circumstances of Japan’s Ratification as a Factor
Indicating Conflict
The circumstances surrounding Japan’s ultimate decision to ratify the
Convention are themselves indicative of the likelihood that Japan will not
strictly uphold the Convention. Some commentators note that Japan
ultimately conceded to the treaty only after overwhelming international
pressure by the U.S. and other Member States.188 In 2007, the pressure
began with a U.S. initiative calling on Japan to take immediate measures
to solve the problem of international parental child abduction.189 In 2009,
having yet to receive effective response, the U.S., sponsored by the U.S.
Embassy in Tokyo, initiated a “Symposium on International Parental Child
Abduction” to address Japanese courts’ ineffective resolution of the
problem.190 The embassies of the U.S., United Kingdom, France, and
Canada subsequently issued a joint press release encouraging Japan to
ratify the Convention.191
International pressure continued in early 2010 when the U.S. and seven
other Western nations sent ambassadors to meet with the Japanese Prime
Minister aiming to encourage Japan to address domestic family law issues
relating to custody.192 In September 2010, the U.S. passed House
Resolution 1326, calling on the Japanese government to address the
problem of U.S. citizen children being abducted to and retained in Japan, and

186. See id. at art. 28(2)(iii) (referring to “circumstances that make it difficult for the
petitioner or the respondent to provide care for the child in the state of habitual residence”).
187. Jones, supra note 112, at 24−25.
188. See Yaffa Fredrick, Japan’s Child Abduction Laws in Limbo, WORLD POLICY
BLOG (May 6, 2014), http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/05/06/japans-child-abductionlaws-limbo (quoting Jeremy Morley); Jane Kitagawa, Left Behind: Parents Challenge
Japan’s Dismal Child Abduction Laws, METROPOLIS (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.
internationalfamilylawfirm.com/2014/01/left-behind-parents-challenge-japans.html (quoting
Bruce Gherbetti).
189. The initiative referred to is the “Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National
Government Act.” Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act, Pub.
L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007); Boykin, supra note 99, at 458−59.
190. Boykin, supra note 99, at 459.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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urging Japan to cooperate with other nations and promptly adopt the
Convention.193
Another symposium was held in March 2010, where ambassadors to
Japan from the U.S. and several other countries met with Japanese officials
to hear expert discussions on international parental child abduction.194 At
the conclusion of the symposium, the ambassadors issued a more favorable
press release, still urging Japan to join the Convention, but indicating that
Japan had made some positive efforts and initiatives.195 In May 2011,
Japan created a legislative plan to move towards conformity with the
Convention, and, in July 2011, a Justice Ministry panel convened to
establish judicial procedures for returning children pursuant to the
Convention.196 Finally, in November 2011, the Japanese Prime Minister
announced that the bill to join the treaty would be sent to the Japanese
legislature.197
Considering this extensive record of international pressure, it is highly
unlikely that Japan joined the Convention on its own initiative. Currently, it
seems doubtful that Japan will emerge as a strict enforcer of a treaty to
which it probably never wished to belong in the first place. Until Japan
implements domestic reforms to conform its family law and court systems to
the intent of the Convention, prospects of compliance remain uncertain.
IV. A PROSPECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION
As discussed below, international mediation provides the necessary
element of neutrality to achieve successful enforcement of the Convention.
At the outset, mediation has certain advantages and limitations that
warrant discussion. Next, an exploration of the proposed system of
international mediation will demonstrate how it would overcome the

193. Under the precise language of the Resolution, Japan is called on to address
“[t]he urgent problem of abduction to and retention of the United States citizen children in
Japan, to work closely with the Government of the United States to return these children to
their custodial parent or to the original jurisdiction for a custody determination in the
United States, to provide left-behind parents with immediate access to their children, and
to adopt without delay the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction.” Id. (quoting H.R. 1326, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010)).
194. Id.
195. Notably, by May 2010, Japan had already been pressed to ratify the Convention by
thirty-two countries. Id. at 460.
196. Id. at 461.
197. Id. at 462.
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typical disadvantages of mediation and incorporate effective mechanisms,
including undertakings, measures expanding mediator authority, selection of
mediators through an ideal candidate body, and comprehensive selection
standards and training of mediators. An illustration will then show how
the proposed international mediation system would function in practice.
Finally, the overarching issue of whether the proposed system requires an
amendment to the Convention will be addressed.
A. Mediation as a Means of Achieving Neutrality in
Convention Enforcement
In recent years, the U.S. proposed and implemented measures in response
to Convention non-compliance.198 There is some evidence that unilateral,
serious sanctions targeting one particular country are effective;199 however,
such a tactic does not address the cause or the extent of the problem
internationally. From an international perspective, the primary issue is
that countries are able to take advantage of the broad language of the
Convention’s exceptions, interpreting them in a way that satisfies their
own nationalistic biases and ultimately thwarting the Convention’s purposes.
The problem of favoring one’s own country may be intransigent and
hence, any effective solution must inject an element of neutrality into the
judicial process.
In the context of the Article 13(b) defense to returning a child to his or
her State of habitual residence, one way such neutrality and consistency
may arise is through international mediation. Theoretically, such a system
would provide an international list of mediators, a body charged with

198. For instance, the “Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction
Prevention and Return Act of 2014” was introduced in Congress on September 28, 2013
and signed by the President on August 8, 2014; it authorizes the President to take certain
actions against noncompliant countries, including: “a demarche (a diplomatic request or
intercession with a foreign official or a protest about a government’s policy or actions); an
official public statement detailing unresolved cases; a public condemnation; a delay or
cancellation of one or more bilateral working, official, or state visits; the withdrawal,
limitation, or suspension of U.S. development or security assistance, or assistance to a
central government; a formal request to a foreign country to extradite an individual who is
engaged in abduction and who has been formally accused of, charged with, or convicted of an
extraditable offense; or other commensurate actions”. See Sean and David Goldman
International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014, H.R. 3212, 113th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2014), at § 202 [hereinafter Sean and David Goldman Act of 2014].
199. An example can be found in the case of Sean Goldman in 2009, where the U.S.
was successful in its petition for the child’s return from Brazil only after
congressional threats that involved cutting off trade benefits. The threats, if carried out,
would have caused a substantial economic impact. See Sean Goldman’s Return to U.S.
Imminent?, CBS NEWS (Dec. 23, 2009, 7:25 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/seangoldmans-return-to-us-imminent/.
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selecting candidates, and specific criteria for how mediators would be chosen
and certified. The parties involved in a Convention dispute would then
have to stipulate to submit to mediation in the country retaining
jurisdiction over the matter (i.e., the court of the abducted-to nation).
As an introductory example, consider a child whose mother abducts him
from his habitual residence in Japan, in breach of his father’s custody rights,
and takes him to the United States. The mother then initiates Convention
proceedings in the U.S. and invokes the Article 13(b) exception, on grounds
that clearly fall short of a typical “grave risk of harm” situation. The
Convention would mandate the Court to order the child’s return to Japan,
but it could also order mediation to resolve disputes between the parties
over any issues beyond the scope of the Convention.200 Both parties would
then have to stipulate in the U.S. court to be bound by the outcome of
international mediation, and subsequently choose and agree on a
representative from the list of international mediators to handle their case.
Ideally, the parties would reach a mutually agreeable solution with the
assistance of the international mediator. The mediator would draft an
opinion reflecting the parties’ agreements, and the U.S. court could
subsequently adopt the mediated solution as a judicial order. An even
more effective solution would allow (or oblige) the Japanese court to
register a mirror order of the U.S. judicial order, thus giving it binding
legal effect in both States.
B. Mediation: Background, Advantages, and Limitations
Mediation is “one of the most widely promoted methods of alternative
dispute resolution in family law.”201 The 2001 meeting of the Special
Commission to review the operation of the Convention (“the Commission”)
recommended that “Central Authorities”202 regularly seek voluntary return

200. For example, such issues might encompass visitation, custody, contact, living
arrangements, payment of child support, or reimbursement of other expenses. Delegating
the resolution of these issues to international mediation would likely give courts a greater
incentive to return children to their States of habitual residence without delay.
201. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, REVISED DRAFT: GUIDE TO GOOD
PRACTICE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS ON
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION, PART V—MEDIATION 11, available at http://www.
hcch.net/upload/wop/abdguide5_mediation_en.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE].
202. “Central Authorities” are the organizational bodies charged with communication
related to, and implementation of, the Convention within their respective Member States.
For example, in the U.S., the Central Authority is the U.S. Department of State, Office of
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“where possible and appropriate . . . by referral of parties to a specialist
organization providing an appropriate mediation service.”203 The Commission
also recognized that courts play a central role in that respect.204 At a 2009
Council meeting, members of the Hague Conference adopted
conclusions and recommendations requiring the establishment of a
“Working Party” ( “the Party”) to “promote the development of mediation
structures to help resolve cross-border disputes concerning custody of or
contact with children.”205 The Party consisted of experts from independent
mediation groups, from a handful of parties to the Convention, and from
non-contracting States.206 The Party subsequently created “Draft Principles”
for establishing mediation structures, which some States had already
adopted into domestic law by early 2011. 207 Those same States also
designated “Central Contact Point[s]” for international family mediation,
which provide specialized information regarding international mediation
services in their respective jurisdictions.208 The 2011 Commission meeting
encouraged other States to follow the trend by creating their own “Central
Contact Point(s).”209
For purposes of using international mediation to resolve Convention
disputes, the establishment of the Party indicates some progression. Ideally,
another Hague Conference should be held in order to encourage the
expansion of this group of experts. The experts could then work together
to create mediation structures similar to the ones discussed above, but this
time with the goal of establishing a single, uniform international mediation
system. The structure would ultimately serve as a blueprint for the selected
international mediators. As for the “Central Contact Point(s)” already
initiated by some States, it may be beneficial to draw candidates for the
international mediator list from those offices’ databases because they

Children’s Issues. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, AUTHORITIES UNDER THE
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.
details&aid=133. As for Japan, it designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its Central
Authority. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, AUTHORITIES UNDER THE,
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD
ABDUCTION: JAPAN, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=974.
203. GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 14. The 2006 meeting of the
Commission reaffirmed the 2001 recommendations. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 15.
206. Id. at 16.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 39.
209. Id.
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likely possess valuable international mediation skills and could be
summoned from various States that are parties to the Convention.210
Mediation has several advantages over other forms of dispute resolution.
For instance, mediated solutions are more sustainable and more likely to
achieve compliance than court solutions.211 Moreover, mediation is flexible,
cost-effective,212 and “empowers the parties to face future conflicts in a
more constructive way.”213 Disadvantages of mediation include the risk
that agreed-upon solutions will not have legal effect in the future,214 the
special attention required in situations of possible domestic violence, and
the impossibility of resolving some conflicts in a civil manner. Another
problem that arises in the context of international family mediation is the
fact that jurisdictions often have different perspectives of how much weight
to accord the best interests of the child.215 Because mediators have limited
procedural powers (e.g., with regard to interviewing the child), certain
safeguards may be necessary to protect the best interests of the children.216
210. See id. Presumably, every mediator candidate should reside in a country that
has ratified the Convention. Otherwise, the mediators would have no relevant connection
to the treaty.
211. Id. at 20.
212. Id. at 20−21. The advantage of cost-effectiveness is particularly important in
the context of Convention proceedings, as the left-behind parent often lacks the financial
resources necessary to travel to the abducted-to nation and litigate there for an extended
period of time. For instance, in the previously cited case of Sean Goldman, the father
(David Goldman) spent approximately $360,000 in legal and travel expenses over a period
of four and a half years. Timothy Weinstein, The Financial Cost of Child Abduction,
BRING SEAN HOME FOUNDATION (Apr. 2009), http://bringseanhome.org/resources/ the-leftbehind-parent/the-financial-cost-of-child-abduction/. However, mediation is generally much
less expensive than litigation. See Matthew Rushton, Counting the Cost of Mediation, JAMS
INT’L BLOG (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.jamsinternational.com/mediation/counting -costmediation.
213. GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 20.
214. For instance, some jurisdictions refuse to give legal effect to mediated solutions
without court approval. Also, legal systems may restrict parents’ ability to limit child
support payments by agreement. Id. at 22−23.
215. See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTIONS:
FACTSHEET (citing Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, Grand Chamber judgment of 6
July 2010, §§ 132−37), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Child_
abductions_ENG.pdf (“The child’s interest. . .dictates that the child’s ties with its family
must be maintained, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit. It
follows that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that
everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, if and when appropriate, to
‘rebuild’ the family.”) This view does not seem to align with the Japanese cultural view
that children’s best interests are served by sole custody arrangements, as discussed above.
216. GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 20.
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Moreover, to address the enforcement concern, “appropriate procedures
should be made available to give legal effect to mediated agreements, be
it by court approval, court registration, or otherwise.”217
C. The Proposed International Mediation System as an
Effective Mechanism
In light of these considerations, the proposed solution of international
mediation must address the disadvantages of mediation, as well as provide
adequate training, standards, and evaluation of international mediators. In
the context of a Convention proceeding, the major disadvantages of
mediation would likely include: (1) the risk of lack of future enforcement of
mediated solutions; (2) the inconsistency of views regarding the best
interests of the child; and (3) the unique sensitivity of cases involving
domestic violence.
Overcoming the risk of the legal unenforceability of mediated solutions in
the future is feasible. As previously mentioned, both the party from the
abducted-to State and the party from State of habitual residence would
have to stipulate to mediation in the court with jurisdiction over the
Convention proceedings (i.e., the court of the abducted-to State). Assuming
the parties reach such a stipulation, the Court would then have authority
to order them to pursue mediation and be legally bound by its outcome.
After mediation, the Court of the abducted-to State could adopt the
mediated solution—drafted by the mediator in the form of a legal
opinion—as a judicial order. That would ensure the enforceability of the
mediated solution in that State.
However, the enforceability of the mediated solution in the State of
habitual residence may be more problematic. To overcome that concern,
the court of the returned-to State should have a means of registering a
judicial order that mirrors the original order in the abducted-to State.218

217. Id. at 25.
218. For instance, the UCCJEA, adopted in the U.S., provides for the registration of
foreign orders. See U.S. COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 17, at 53. This notion of giving
“full faith and credit” to judicial orders of other nations may be problematic in some
situations. For instance, the U.S. would likely be hesitant to give full faith and credit to
judicial orders of countries that do not share American political, humanitarian, or other
ideals, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Cuba, or North Korea. However, international
mediation should help mitigate the concern because the court orders that are ultimately
adopted will be shaped by neutral mediators who duly consider the interests of U.S. citizen
children. Furthermore, none of the above-listed countries are parties to the Convention. If
those countries join in the future, the issue may need to be revisited, but it is currently
beyond the scope of the Convention. If the issue does arise, the Article 20 exception may
come into play, allowing refusal of return if the humanitarian and freedom-related
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As a result, the mediated solution would be legally enforceable in the
returned-to State as well. The parties would likely comply with the solution
after the child is returned not only because they could face legal
consequences, but also because they would have been actively involved
in the process of creating the solution. Additionally, after recognizing the
advantages of mediation—particularly the financial cost savings, as
discussed above—the parties would not likely have any desire to return to
a formal, adversarial court setting.
With respect to the other concerns of how to determine the best interests of
the child and the sensitive nature of domestic violence cases, adequate
training, selection standards, and evaluation of international mediators can
largely address those. Because the Convention is explicitly premised on
furthering the interests of children, that goal should both be emphasized in
training and be incorporated into the selection process. Mediators who are
ultimately selected should be committed to seeking solutions that further
the interests of children worldwide and be knowledgeable of the
Convention’s other underlying principles. In practice, the mediators should
not be subject to procedural limitations such as being restricted from
interviewing the child. Instead, they should have wide latitude to discover
relevant evidence and subsequently use that information to assist the
parties in reaching agreements. Additionally, mediators should be regularly
evaluated by a neutral panel to ensure that their conduct is both effective
and consistent with the principles of the Convention. The panel performing
the evaluation should analyze mediators’ records in light of how they have
considered the interests of children in the past, their ability to maintain a
neutral perspective, and their overall capacity to lead parties to successful
agreements.
The Convention’s objective of furthering the interests of children is
most critical at this stage because the original judicial decision to return a
child or to not return a child will often dictate prompt return to the State
of habitual residence without any significant consideration of what is in
the child’s best interests. Moreover, States will be more willing to return
children to their countries of habitual residence if they are assured that the
children’s best interests will be adequately accounted for in subsequent
mediation. Thus, international mediation would strengthen compliance
with the Convention by means of prompt return to the State of habitual
principles of the returned-to State would be inconsistent with return. See Convention,
supra note 1, at art. 20.
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residence (including a more proper, narrow application of the “grave risk
of harm” defense), as well as eliminate nationalistic bias by giving States
a way to ensure the safety of their citizens through a neutral process.
The training and selection of mediators can also address the concern
regarding the unique nature of domestic violence cases. Training programs
should incorporate extensive teachings about domestic violence and
emphasize what special attention is required in such cases to reach mediated
solutions. To improve skill level, candidates with valuable experience in
domestic violence disputes should have priority over other candidates, and
experts should have continuous opportunities to contribute knowledge to the
selected mediators, perhaps at international conferences or lectures.
The fact that amicable solutions are not always possible is an inevitable
risk of mediation. Undoubtedly, there will be circumstances in which
international mediators will be unable to lead the parties to agreeable
solutions regarding the legal relationships between them after a child’s
return. Regardless, international mediation will likely strengthen States’
compliance with the Convention across the spectrum. Even if all mediations
do not result in agreement, the mere prospect that many will is sufficient
to warrant implementation of the system. Parties who do not reach
mediated agreements will presumably have to resort back to the current
system of domestic litigation. Seemingly, then, there is nothing to lose.
1. Undertakings as a Component of International Mediation
In response to the unique nature of domestic violence cases, the judicial
doctrine of “undertakings” is a proposed solution that would “strike a
balance and ensure the safety of the child and mother” in such
circumstances.219 Undertakings are defined as “promises, usually by the
left-behind parent to perform certain obligations and agree to certain
conditions to facilitate return of the child prior to the time the foreign court
assumes jurisdiction and can issue an order.”220 For example, in the
context of domestic abuse, possible undertakings might include a condition
forbidding contact between the abusive parent and the abducting parent
effective upon the child’s return or a condition requiring that the abducting
parent have “exclusive occupancy of the marital home.”221 It seems that
undertakings would provide relief to Japanese courts seeking to ensure the

219. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 390.
220. Linda Silberman, Interpreting the Hague Abduction Convention: In Search of
a Global Jurisprudence, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV 1049, 1076 n.117 (2005). Under international
mediation, however, the facilitating conditions would ultimately become the order in the
foreign jurisdiction.
221. Reynolds, supra note 30, at 396.

244

ZDENEK (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE)

[VOL. 16: 209, 2014]

10/10/2016 3:27 PM

Hague Abduction Convention Compliance
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.

safety of their citizens, while simultaneously allowing courts to render
decisions consistent with the intent of the Convention.
The international mediation system could easily incorporate undertakings
in order to give Member States greater assurance of the safety and
wellbeing of their citizens and would thereby improve compliance with
the Convention. The Second Circuit decision in Gaudin v. Remis serves
as a useful example of the judicial use of undertakings.222 In that case, the
father brought the children to the U.S. from their State of habitual
residence in Canada and the mother subsequently petitioned in an American
court for their return.223 The district court concluded that the Article 13(b)
“grave risk of harm” defense properly applied.224 However, the Ninth Circuit
remanded on the ground that “even if such a risk existed, the district court
erred in failing to consider alternative remedies by means of which the
children could be transferred back to Canada without risking psychological
harm.”225 Courts can carefully consider and establish such remedies (i.e.,
judicial undertakings) to ensure the safety of the parties involved.
If parties could pursue undertakings initially through mediation and
then have them as adopted as court orders in both applicable States, such
undertakings would likely be more effective than judicially prescribed
undertakings. Undoubtedly, each family involved in a Convention return
proceeding has unique problems and circumstances. Seemingly, then, the
parties involved in a particular case would be better equipped to craft their
own undertakings than a judge who is not nearly as familiar with their
underlying situation. Under the proposed solution, the international
mediator would fill the shoes of the judge, familiarize his or herself with
the details of the particular situation, and serve as a neutral third party in
helping the parties determine which undertakings would best serve the
interests of the child.
Another example of an undertaking that could be accomplished through
international mediation to mitigate the risk of domestic violence is the
establishment of a probation period in the State of habitual residence
following the child’s return. During the designated period, social workers or
law enforcement officers could periodically check on the parties until they

222.
223.
224.
225.

Gaudin, 415 F.3d at 1032.
Id.
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1035.
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can determine that the child is safe.226 If the parties agree to such a
condition via mediation, the court in the abducted-to State could then
coordinate with authorities in the returned-to State to provide the requisite
services.
A court’s return order can encompass undertakings and can lead to
sanctions if disobeyed. However, such orders are not automatically
enforceable in the country to which the child is returned.227 In overcoming
this concern, the most effective solution would be registration of a mirror
order in the returned-to State, reflecting the mediated agreement originally
reached and subsequently adopted by the court in the abducted-to State.
Any conditions would then be legally enforceable in both countries.
Generally, the use of undertakings is compatible with international mediation.
Mediators, unlike judges, would be able to approach each situation from
a neutral point of view, assist the parties in reaching an agreement based
on extensive familiarity with the case, and ultimately have a means of
transforming the agreement into a legally binding court order.
2. Measures Expanding International Mediator Authority to Secure
Convention Compliance
To ensure that international mediators are as effective as possible, the
proposed system should incorporate certain measures to strengthen their
authority. First, mediators should undertake the responsibility of drafting
prospective court orders, which courts should then consider and adopt
with minimal alteration. Moreover, Member States, through the United
Nations, should establish an international sanctions committee to deter
non-compliance with the Convention.
a. Mediator-Drafted Opinions Requiring Court Consideration
International mediators must have substantial authority to direct mediations
and secure effective outcomes.228 As previously discussed, the first task
226. Alternatively, if the prospective abuse was to be targeted only at the mother,
authorities could investigate that matter as well until they are certain that no abuse is
occurring in the child’s presence that would pose a “grave risk” of psychological or
(possibly) physical harm.
227. See Silberman, supra note 220, at 1076 n.117; Patricia M. Hoff, The Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: A Curriculum for
American Judges and Lawyers, A.B.A., at 101 (Oct. 1997) (explaining that there is no
legal basis for requiring enforcement in the other country, but that an order may be
enforced out of comity and will at least be persuasive to the courts of that country).
228. International mediators should have much more authority than domestic family
law mediators typically possess; otherwise, they will likely be ineffective. For instance,
mediators generally lack power to decide any issue on the parties’ behalf or to compel
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of international mediators is assisting the parties in reaching a satisfactory
solution. Subsequently, mediators should be required to make findings
and draft an opinion for the court with jurisdiction over the Convention
proceedings. The opinion should encompass the agreed-upon terms and
conditions effective after the child returns to his or her State of habitual
residence. The opinion should also include clear factual and legal
justifications for each provision. The Court, in turn, should be legally
obliged to consider the mediator’s drafted opinion. Ideally, the judge
would adopt the opinion as the order of the court. If the judge has certain
reservations, he or she could submit a list of suggested revisions, with
justifications, and request an updated draft. The mediator should make the
requested changes only if they do not interfere with the intent of the
Convention. In either situation, the mediator, as opposed to the judge,
should possess superior control over the content of the order that is
ultimately adopted.
This is an ideal scenario for multiple reasons. For one, the mediator
would likely be more familiar than the judge with the details of the
particular case. As such, the mediator is in a better position to create a
legal solution that the parties will comply with and that furthers the
interests of the particular children involved. As a disinterested party with
no particular reason to favor one country over another, the mediator would
also be more neutral than the judge. Thus, the mediator is more likely to
draft an opinion that is free of nationalistic bias (and hence more credible
from the perspective of the parties) and consistent with the international
intent of the Convention.229
Another important justification for substantial mediator authority is to
encourage participant cooperation in the mediation process. There will
undoubtedly be times where one party or the other is not a “bona fide”
participant in the sense that he or she is insisting on an outcome that is
inconsistent with the Convention. In such a situation, the mediator should
be able to make a finding that the party has failed to participate in the
mediation in good faith. That finding should be incorporated in the drafted
opinion, and the Court should be required to give it full recognition and order
the party to comply. The non-compliant party should have an opportunity

their agreement. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 467,
471 (1991).
229. An incidental benefit of giving international mediators the authority to draft
opinions is that courts would likely bear significantly less judicial burden.
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to become a “bona fide” participant by a specified deadline. If the party
does not do so, the court should resolve the entire Convention dispute against
the non-compliant party and in favor of the other participant. Courts will
likely be hesitant to take such action when the non-compliant party is a
citizen of their State. Thus, it is important to require such action by means of
a legal provision in the Convention.230
b. Establishment of a Sanctions Committee to Deter Non-Compliance
Mediators must be able to effectively insist on a particular outcome in
order to fulfill the Convention’s purposes. Courts may be hesitant about
international mediation and some will likely refuse to comply with the
mediation process, for example, by refusing to consider a mediator’s
drafted opinion. Where a court chooses to ignore mediation, there should
be a means of imposing economic sanctions against the State where that
court sits. An international sanctions committee at the United Nations
(“U.N.”) would be an effective arena for such disputes. Such a committee
could easily take form as a subsection of the U.N. Security Council.
Indeed, the Security Council has designated more than a dozen sanctions
committees in the past.231
Pursuant to Chapter IV of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council may
use enforcement mechanisms “to maintain or restore international peace
and security.”232 First and foremost, the Security Council “calls upon the
parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommends methods
of adjustment or terms of settlement.”233 If diplomatic efforts fail, the
Security Council may then use targeted economic sanctions to pressure
certain States or entities to comply with its objectives.234 The Security
Council is an appropriate body for applying sanctions internationally
because of its “universal character.”235 Common examples of sanctions
historically used include travel bans, arms embargoes, and freezing
of financial assets.236 In recent years, the Security Council summoned
independent expert groups to help monitor sanctions and achieve

230. Such a legal provision would probably require an amendment to the Convention,
the implications of which will be discussed below.
231. See U.N. Charter ch. IV, arts. 10−12; UN Security Council Sanctions Committees,
supra note 40.
232. UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, supra note 40.
233. United Nations Security Council, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sc/.
234. See UN Security Council Sanctions Committees, supra note 40.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 751 (1992) and
1907 (2009) Concerning Somalia and Eritrea, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sc/
committees/751/.
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compliance.237 The Secretariat also established a list of expert candidates
based on specific qualifications for that purpose.238
If the courts of a particular State wrongfully disregard international
mediation, the Security Council should call on that State to bring its judiciary
into compliance. It should recommend specific measures that would help
the State to effectuate that purpose and attempt to reach a tangible
agreement (for instance, where the State promises to establish certain
measures to promote compliance, or to bring its courts into compliance by
a specific date). If initial efforts fail, the Security Council could draft a
resolution describing the particular sanction to be enforced, the State or
States to be targeted, and the “tasks mandated to monitoring mechanisms.”239
The resolution should incorporate expert recommendations regarding the
most effective and least oppressive means of securing compliance under
the circumstances.
After the Security Council approves the resolution, the targeted State
should receive notice of the prospective sanction and how to overcome it.
If the State still refuses to comply, the sanction should take effect and
monitoring mechanisms should be established and executed with the help
of independent experts. Ideally, the economic sanction would be
burdensome enough to secure compliance of the targeted State, but not so
burdensome that it would engender humanitarian concerns.240 At the point
of compliance, the sanction would be lifted. Over time, other States would
likely realize the potential repercussions of non-compliance and develop a
stronger incentive to ensure judicial cooperation with international
mediation.241

237. See S.C. Res. 997, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/2006/997 (Dec. 22, 2006).
238. Id. ¶ 11.
239. Id. ¶ 32.
240. An example of this view is expressed in the Sean and David Goldman
International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2014, which explicitly states
that any actions taken against noncompliant countries may not interfere with humanitarian
assistance. Sean and David Goldman Act of 2014, supra note 198, at § 202.
241. Alternatively, an entirely new sanctions committee could be created for the
limited purpose of reviewing Convention disputes. However, the creation of such a
committee would likely be costly and time-consuming. Since the U.N. Security Council
has extensive experience with establishing sanctions committees, it appears to be more
prepared and better qualified to handle the task.
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3. UNICEF as an Ideal Body for Selecting International Mediators
Selecting a list of international mediators is critical to the ultimate
efficacy of the system. In order to achieve the desired element of neutrality,
mediators should be selected by an international group. The group should not
be biased towards any particular country’s cultural perspectives or
domestic policies. A potential candidate group for selecting international
mediators is the United Nations Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”). UNICEF
works in more than 190 countries worldwide to help better children’s lives
by providing for essential needs such a health care, education, and
protection from dangerous circumstances.242 It is part of the Global
Movement for Children,243 and it promotes the Convention on the Rights
of the Child (“CRC”).244
The CRC is an international treaty that was created in 1989 to promote
the human rights of minors, including cultural, political, economic, social,
and civil rights.245 Some of the specific rights guaranteed to children by
the CRC are the rights to survival, full development, protection from external
harm, and participation in family life.246 The CRC’s explicit principles
include: “non-discrimination; devotion to the best interests of the child;
the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of
the child.”247 Member States to the CRC are obligated to uphold the best
interests of children in carrying out all domestic policies and actions.248
UNICEF is an ideal candidate for selecting international mediators
because its principles are largely intertwined with CRC’s goal to secure
the best interests of children.249 Because the Convention itself is grounded in
furthering children’s interests, UNICEF would be well equipped to choose
mediators in furtherance of that objective. The current problem of
nationalistic bias would likely disappear in a system where mediators are
242. About UNICEF: Who We Are, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_
introduction.html (last updated May 23, 2012).
243. The Global Movement for Children is a coalition aiming to better the lives of
children throughout the world. Id.
244. Id.
245. Rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNICEF, http://www.
unicef.org/crc/index_30177.html; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1980,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
246. Rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 245.
247. CRC Turns 20: About the Convention, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/rightsite/
237_202.htm; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 245, at arts. 2, 3, 6, 12.
248. CRC Turns 20: About the Convention, supra note 247.
249. See The Convention on the Rights of the Child: About the Convention, UNICEF,
http://www.unicef.org/rightsite/237_202.htm (“The provisions and principles of the CRC
guide UNICEF in its mission of advocating for the protection of children’s rights, helping
children to meet their basic needs and expanding their opportunities to reach their full
potential”).
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chosen by representatives concerned primarily with the best interests of
children. While States have varying interpretations of how to secure such
interests, the UNICEF approach to achieving that goal would be based on
neutral principles. In the context of the Article 13(b) defense to returning a
child, the representatives would likely express concern over matters such as
what psychological or physical harm the child might suffer as a
consequence of being returned. However, they would have no inherent
reason to exhibit partiality toward any particular member State. Hence,
consideration of such matters would be from a disinterested perspective.
Moreover, issues that do not truly hinder the interests of children would
not appeal to the biases of particular decision-makers, such as the
language the child will grow up speaking, the culture that the child will
identify with, or the environment in which the child will be raised.250 As
a result, the potential to corrupt the process would be greatly reduced. The
ability of courts to consider subjective issues such as a child’s
prospective political, social, or cultural upbringing in making Convention
decisions—even when the only justification is a favoring of one’s own
culture—must be defeated by establishing neutrality at the outset of the
process. Because promoting the interests of children is consistent with the
intent of the Convention and circumventing nationalistic bias, UNICEF
would be an effective selection body.
A potential concern of giving UNICEF authority to select international
mediators is the fact that the U.S. has not ratified the CRC.251 The U.S.
has expressed several reservations to ratifying the CRC. One of the most
important reservations is the treaty’s advocacy that children and adults
bear equal rights.252 This may be based on “assumptions that parents will
be likely to protect children’s best interests, beliefs that parental autonomy,
will promote healthy diversity, and concerns about the dangers of undue
state intervention” into the sacred area of family life.253 The CRC grants broad

250. That assumes, of course, that neither of the alternative circumstances to which
the child will be returned is substantially inadequate. For example, if the child would be
returned to a dangerous environment, such as a war zone, a mediator would be correct to
let that influence his or her decision.
251. The United States is the only country other than Somalia that has not ratified
the CRC. Elizabeth Bartholet, Ratification by the United States of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Pros and Cons from a Child’s Rights Perspective, 633 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 80, 80 (2010).
252. See id. at 84−88.
253. Id. at 85.
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rights of “participation,” 254 “provision,” 255 and “protection”256 to
children, but those rights seem to be inconsistent with current U.S. law
and policy.
Because UNICEF is a stark promoter of the CRC’s principles,257 the
U.S. may be hesitant to give UNICEF the authority to select international
mediators. However, the fact that the U.S. has expressed reservations
regarding certain aspects of the CRC does not imply that it is inherently
opposed to furthering children’s interests. In fact, the opposite is true, as
the U.S. is a strong proponent of the Convention,258 which itself explicitly
aims to further the interests of children.259
If the U.S. were to object to UNICEF’s selection authority as inconsistent
with domestic policy, an alternative solution would be to ratify the CRC.
In light of the success of international pressure as a means of securing
Japan’s ratification of the Convention, a similar pattern of international
pressure would likely achieve the same effect with regard to the U.S. and
the CRC.260 After a selection group is established, it could then designate a
smaller body of members to pass on applicants, send out invitations to

254. “Participation” encompasses the right of children who are capable of forming
independent beliefs to express such beliefs freely in all matters impacting them. However,
U.S. law displays a preference for parents’ rights to make decisions for their children in
almost all such matters, “even when this raises enormous questions as to whether the
child’s best interests are served.” Id. at 88−89 (emphasis added).
255. “Provision” incorporates the right of children to receive affirmative assistance
from the State for purposes of social welfare, health, and education. However, the U.S.
does not generally recognize the affirmative right of anyone to receive financial assistance from
the government, instead promoting a tradition of “negative rights,” such as “the individual
autonomy right to be free from undue intervention by the state.” Id. at 91.
256. “Protection” encompasses the right of children to be free from parental abuse
and neglect, placing an affirmative obligation on States to protect children within their
borders from such harm. Although every U.S. state is legislatively required to protect
children from abuse and neglect, “children have no generally recognized constitutional
right to such protection, in contrast to the generally recognized constitutional right parents have
to raise their children free from undue state intervention.” Moreover, states are not
constitutionally required to protect against maltreatment of children. Id. at 93.
257. See The Convention on the Rights of the Child: About the Convention, supra
note 249.
258. See 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24, at 5 (“Since the Convention
provides the most effective way to facilitate the prompt return of abducted children to their
country of habitual residence and to help deter abduction, encouraging countries to join
the Convention is a high priority.”).
259. Convention, supra note 1. As previously noted, the opening sentence provides
that Member States are “[f]irmly convinced that the interests of children are of paramount
importance in matters relating to their custody.” Id.
260. Another possible solution that would avoid the problem of American hesitance to
UNICEF as a selection body would be to create an entirely new body of representatives to
select mediators on behalf of the Convention. However, creating such a body from the
ground up could be very costly, thus its success is probably more theoretical than practical.
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potential candidates, and make final selections based on specific criteria
and qualifications.
4. Selection Standards and Training of International Mediators
Another important issue is how the selection body would determine and
apply selection criteria. Mediators in the U.S. have several tasks. The Test
Design Project (“TDP”), an independent group, established a list of
desired mediator characteristics based on the most common tasks that
mediators perform in practice.261 Many mediators and other interview
subjects have offered general endorsements of this list. 262 The named
qualities include: impartiality; effective identification and discovery of
relevant information; awareness and concern for others’ needs; pursuit of
collaborative and workable solutions; effectiveness in helping parties
reach final solutions; effectiveness in managing interactions among the
parties and dealing with conflicts; and “adequate competence in the issues
and type of dispute to facilitate communication, help parties develop options,
and alert parties to relevant legal information.”263
Additionally, in 1989, the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(“SPIDR”) led an investigation and ultimately handed down recommendations
regarding mediator qualifications, including that a variety of organizations,
as opposed to a single entity, establish such qualifications,264 and that
qualification criteria draw primarily from performance as opposed to paper
credentials.265 In establishing effective criteria for selecting international
mediators, the TDP’s list of traits and the SPIDR’s recommendations
serve as a good foundation. However, similar criteria and recommendations
endorsed by other signatory nations should also be considered and
incorporated with the ultimate goal of creating an internationally balanced
and comprehensive list of mediator qualifications.

261. Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy and Practice
in Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 303, 308 (2004).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 310.
264. Id. This could be effectuated by having experts from various independent
groups submit proposed qualifications. The selection body could be required to give due
consideration to all of the proposals before creating a final list.
265. Id. This recommendation of selecting mediators based on performance as
opposed to paper credentials could be achieved over time by evaluating international
mediators based on past performance in Convention disputes.
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A related issue is how mediators are to be trained after they are selected.
Appropriate mediator training is critical to any effective mediation system,
particularly if the system is designed to function on an international
level.266 Some States already have legislation in place to regulate mediator
training and qualifications.267 Alternatively, legal systems that do not
regulate mediator training generally lack a uniform approach to mediator
training requirements and qualifications.268
In cases involving international child abduction, the Hague Conference of
Private International Law (“the Conference”) recommends that mediators
have substantial experience in family law mediation, undergo additional
training specifically tailored to international child abduction, and “continu[e]
training to maintain their professional competence.”269 The Conference
also encourages States to establish training programs and standards for
such mediators and to make the names of specialists publicly available
through family mediator lists.270 Further, States should provide for neutral
evaluation and monitoring of these mediation services while moving towards
common standards for evaluation.271
One organization that already exists to improve the competence of family
law mediators worldwide is the Academy of Professional Family Meditators
(“APFM”). APFM’s vision is “[t]o be the premier international organization
in the development of professional family mediation.”272 To achieve its
vision, APFM holds annual conferences for mediators,273 offers a variety
of educational materials, 274 and seeks to establish a comprehensive
266. See id. at 340.
267. See GUIDE TO GOOD PRACTICE, supra note 201, at 36. For example, in France,
candidates must have professional experience or a national social or health sector diploma
and must successfully make their way through a selection process. Id. Obtaining the
diploma requires a heavily regulated curriculum, including 560 hours of law, sociology, and
psychology training and 70 hours of actual practice. Id. A prospective French mediator
can also obtain the requisite diploma through professional experience, which entails both
an assessment by public authorities of the applicant’s admissibility and an assessment by
an examination panel of “the development of skills [of the applicant] acquired through
experience.” Id. at 36 n.133.
268. Id. at 36.
269. Id. at 38.
270. Id. at 39.
271. Id.
272. APFM: About Us, ACADEMY OF PROFESSIONAL FAMILY MEDIATORS, http://ap
fmnet.org/pg7.cfm.
273. Id.
274. Id. According to APFM’s opening newsletter, “Educational programs and
opportunities will be provided through pre-conference and conference workshops, partnering
with colleges, universities, mediation trainers, on-line distance learning, memberonly collegial bulletin boards, webcasts, teleconferences, and a LISTSERV.” Launch of
the APFM, ACADEMY OF PROFESSIONAL FAMILY MEDIATORS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://apfm
net.org/pg45.cfm.
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educational program for family law mediators that will emphasize
“experience and continuing education requirements.”275 APFM recently
adopted standards for family law mediators.276 Standard II—competence—
requires mediators to have specialized training in family mediation and
the effects of family disputes on parents and children, “including knowledge
of child development, adult psychopathology, domestic abuse and child
abuse and neglect.”277 Mediators must also participate in relevant continuing
education to ensure continuous improvement of their skills and should be
tested for the competency of their work when possible.278
In selecting and training international mediators, all of these
considerations should be taken into account. The selecting body should
establish uniform criteria for choosing candidates with an emphasis on
experience in mediating family law disputes. A training program should
be implemented for selected candidates, focusing primarily on international
parental child abduction, but also on the specific language, goals, and
principles of the Convention. Relevant experience is highly desirable, but
mediators should also be exceptionally familiar with the Convention itself
so that they can lead families to solutions that are consistent with its
purposes. Subsequent training programs should be held periodically to
help mediators maintain their professional competence and adapt to changing
standards. Experts throughout the world should make appearances at
trainings in order to present new and valuable information regarding
international standards of competence, how standards are transforming,
and how to effectively address such changes.
Additionally, an organization similar to APFM should be established,
except, as discussed above, with a more specialized focus on international
parental child abduction. The new organization should adopt similar
competency standards requiring mediators to participate in continuing
education and arrange conferences where mediators can participate in
workshops and continuously acquire new, relevant information. With a
greater number of competent family law mediators among the pool
of candidates, the selected international mediators will likely be more
275.
276.

Launch of the APFM, supra note 274.
APFM Standards of Practice and Training Program Standards, ACADEMY OF
PROFESSIONAL FAMILY MEDIATORS, http://apfmnet.org/pg38.cfm.
277. Standards of Practice for Professional Mediators, ACADEMY OF PROFESSIONAL
FAMILY MEDIATORS (Feb. 4, 2014), available at http://www.apfmnet.org/docs/Standards%20
of%20Practice%20Adopted%20at%202-2-14%20Board%20Meeting-Revised%202-20-14.pdf.
278. Id.
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effective. Moreover, individual Member States should follow the
Conference’s suggestion and initiate comprehensive training programs
for family law mediators. Within the U.S., states have their own requirements
for mediator training279 and continuing mediator education.280 However,
because such requirements vary among states,281 uniformity is unlikely at
the national level. The U.S. and other Member States should work
towards the establishment of nationwide training and continuing education
programs for mediators in order to facilitate interaction and progress at
the international level.
5. Illustration of the Proposed International Mediation Process
The following is an illustration of how international mediation would
function in practice. A man and woman are married in the U.S. and raise
a child there, thus presumably making the U.S. the child’s State of habitual
residence. Upon divorce, the parties assume legal joint custody of the
child, whether by court decree or by the parties’ own out-of-court
arrangement. The mother then flees the country to take up residence in
Japan, bringing the child with her in breach of the father’s custody rights
and thus in violation of the Convention. The father petitions for the child’s
return in Japan and the mother responds by invoking the Article 13(b)
defense. Specifically, she alleges that the father suffers from mental illness
and is too unstable to raise a child. She concludes that sending the child
back to the U.S. would impose a “grave risk of psychological harm” to
the child. She also alleges that the father has been physically violent

279. For example, in Florida, family mediators must complete one of six family
mediation training programs approved by the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Rule
10.100(c) of the Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators. How to
Become a Florida Supreme Court Certified Mediator: Step By Step Guide, FLORIDA
MEDIATION GROUP (Feb. 16, 2011), available at http://www.floridamediationgroup.com/
about/HowToBecomeAMediatorCurrent.pdf. As for New York, it requires mediators to
undergo forty hours of training and have actual experience mediating cases, while training
programs must provide experience-based learning opportunities and include a combination of
“lecture, exercises, small group activities, mediation simulation, and role plays.” Mediation
Training Curriculum Guidelines, D IVISION OF P ROFESSIONAL AND COURT SERVICES,
OFFICE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/
adr/Part146_Curriculum.pdf.
280. In Florida, certified mediators who seek renewal must complete sixteen hours
of Continuing Mediator Education (“CME”), covering the topics of ethics, domestic
violence, and diversity or cultural awareness. CME hours may be earned through a wide
range of methods, including watching or attending a lecture, participating in Internet
presentations, authoring written work submitted for publication with significant mediationrelated content, or completing a “self-directed program” approved by a governmental
licensing board. How to Become a Florida Supreme Court Certified Mediator, supra note 279.
281. See id; Mediation Training Curriculum Guidelines, supra note 279.
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towards her in the past, but there is no other evidence indicating that he
ever physically harmed or would likely harm the child.
The Japanese court would probably be hesitant to send the child back
to the U.S. because of its desire to protect the mother from potential
domestic abuse, along with its biases towards maternal custody and
preserving the child’s national identity.282 However, the parties would
have the opportunity to stipulate to mediation, choose a mediator from the
international panel, and reach an out-of-court solution. The mediator
would, acting as a disinterested party, assist in the negotiation process,
draft an opinion for judicial consideration, and promote consistency with
the principles of the Convention. For purposes of neutrality, the mediator
would not be permitted to have any connection to either State involved in
the dispute. Furthermore, the mediator would have extensive knowledge,
skills, and training with respect to international child abduction , thus
making successful agreement more likely than in domestic family law
mediation.
The parties and the agreed-upon mediator would then attend the
mediation and attempt to negotiate a solution satisfactory to both sides.
The mediator might lead the parties to an agreement such as: if the mother
returns to the U.S., the father will move out of the family residence and
have only limited, supervised visitation with the child. This agreement
would stand at least until the State of habitual residence is able to investigate
the matter further and determine whether the father presents an
endangerment to the child. Alternatively, the father could agree to submit
to evaluation and treatment by a mental health professional in exchange
for the mother’s agreement that he can resume normal visitation with the
child thereafter.
Finally, the mediator would make findings and draft an opinion reflecting
the terms and conditions of mediation, which the Japanese court would be
obliged to consider. The Japanese court would then be able to adopt the
drafted opinion as a judicial order and the U.S. court would have a means
of registering a mirror order. Consequently, the parties would be legally
bound to comply with the mediated agreement in both jurisdictions. Japan
will not likely object to such an arrangement because it would
anticipate reaping the benefits of mediation for its own citizens under the
opposite circumstances—namely, where the U.S. is considering a child’s
prospective return to his or her habitual residence in Japan.
282.

See Reynolds, supra note 30, at 382−84, 386−87.
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6. Overarching Question: An Amendment to the Convention?
Presumably, the proposed solution of international mediation would
require an amendment to the Convention. Article 40 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) covers amendments to
multilateral treaties.283 Specifically, it requires that all Member States be
given notice of and have a right to take part in “the decision as to the
action to be taken in regard to such proposal,” as well as “the negotiation
and conclusion of any agreement for the amendment of the treaty.”284 Any
Member State that does not become a party to the amending agreement is not
bound by that agreement.285 Consequently, before the international
mediation system can function, every party to the Convention must be
notified of the proposed amendment and have the opportunity to contribute
to the shaping of the ultimate provision. The large number of current
Member States could make this problematic. However, there are reasons
to presume that most countries would willingly accede to an amendment
establishing international mediation.
International mediation would better serve the interests of each country’s
citizens. Hypothetically, any given country may currently find that
during a particular period, about half of its Convention proceedings resulted
in a total win for the resident parent, while the other half resulted in a total
loss. Under a system of international mediation, this winner-loser
dynamic would disappear and each case would likely be resolved in a way
that is at least somewhat satisfactory to the resident parent. If Member States
could manage to keep an open mind and appreciate the magnitude of this
benefit, they would not hesitate to agree to the binding amendment.
Moreover, if certain States were to refuse the proposed amendment, it
could likely be pursued without them.286 An amendment binding at least
some of the parties to the Convention would surely be preferable to the
current system, where every party decides cases according to its own
standards. Over time, the benefits of the amendment will begin to
materialize and hesitant Member States will be encouraged to reevaluate
283. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 40, May 22, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The U.S.
and Japan are both VCLT “participants”; the U.S. signed the VCLT on April 24, 1970,
and Japan acceded to it on July 2, 1981. UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (last updated Sept. 16, 2014), https://treaties.
un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Temp
=mtdsg3&lang=en.
284. See Vienna Convention, supra note 283.
285. Id.
286. Article 40 of the VCLT, cited above, merely states that parties are not bound by
an amending agreement if they are not a party to that agreement. It does not prohibit such
amending agreements or provide that they will render all parties unbound. See id.
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their cautiousness. Eventually, States will likely follow the lead of the
amendment’s proponents and accede to the new practice.287
V. CONCLUSION
In light of inconsistent American case law interpreting the Article 13(b)
“grave risk of harm” exception to returning a child, as well as evidence
illustrating that Japan may contravene the intent of the Convention, it is
clear that certain aspects of the Convention require improvement. Currently,
Member States’ courts may take advantage of the broad language of Article
13(b) and other exceptions as a means of serving their own citizens’ interests
and injecting nationalistic bias into their decisions. In particular, for the
past couple of decades, domestic violence has been a concern that
American courts have dealt with in different ways and that Japanese courts
will likely struggle with in the near future. For instance, since 2000, U.S.
courts have experienced a dramatic shift towards allowing the Article 13(b)
defense in domestic violence cases, recognizing the importance of evaluating
the nature of previous abuse and considering whether authorities in the
State of habitual residence will adequately protect both the children and
the abused mothers.288 International mediation is an ideal way for the U.S.
and Japan to conduct such evaluations and establish conditions to ensure
the safety of the parties involved. Moreover, it would significantly reduce
judicial burden by delegating to mediators much of the responsibility that
would otherwise be placed on courts in Convention proceedings.
Significantly, the impact of international mediation would stretch beyond
cases involving parties from the U.S. and Japan. Indeed, it would be equally
as effective in nearly every Convention case involving parties from any
two Member States. To illustrate, consider the signatories that the U.S.
State Department’s 2014 report labeled as non-compliant: Costa Rica,

287. Generally, if certain States yet to ratify the Convention decided to do so in the
future, but were hesitant about the international mediation provision, they could express a
reservation to the treaty with respect to that provision. The VCLT defines reservations and
explain their parameters. Reservations allow States to effectively exclude the legal effect
of a specific provision or provisions of a treaty while still becoming a signatory to it. See
id. arts. 2(1)(d), 19. However, the language of the Convention explicitly states that only
two specific reservations are allowed, and this would not be one of them. See Convention,
supra note 1, arts. 24, 26, 42. Hence, expressing a reservation to the international
mediation provision would not be an option for future signatories.
288. Morley, supra note 149.
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Guatemala, and Honduras.289 As for Costa Rica, the U.S. seems to be
primarily concerned with a 2011 Costa Rican Supreme Court decision,
which ruled that courts hearing Convention proceedings “should consider
‘the best interests of the child’ rather than habitual residence” in those
cases.290 As for Guatemala, the concern—in 2013—related to a more
general inconsistency in how courts apply the Convention’s principles.291
For example, a 2012 appellate court decision affirmed a lower court’s
decision to refuse return on the grounds that “Guatemalan law favors
maternal custody.”292 With respect to Honduras, “the Honduran judiciary
continues to treat Hague cases as custody matters.”293
American unease with regard to these countries probably relates to the
fact that they are carving out new ways to expand their courts’ subjective
latitude in making Convention decisions. Under the current precedents,
Costa Rican judges may rely on subjective justifications drawn from
domestic law concerning the best interests of children. 294 Similarly,
Guatemalan judges may justify refusal of return on the basis of a purely
local, cultural perspective that presumes mothers are better suited to the
task of raising children than fathers.295 Meanwhile, Honduran courts are
able to resolve Convention cases as custody decisions in contradiction of
the Convention.296 Clearly, these countries are not only failing to comply
with the goals and principles of the Convention, but they are injecting
nationalistic bias.
Under the proposed solution of international mediation, these concerns
would be largely eliminated. An international mediator would be far more
qualified to make a “best interests” determination based on neutral
principles and a thorough understanding of the circumstances of the case
than a Costa Rican court with authority to decide what is in the best
interests of children based on whatever legislation it happens to find
important at the time.297 Likewise, an international mediator would be able
to approach the situation from a neutral standpoint, overlook the maternal
custody presumption, and make a careful determination of the most
289. 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24.
290. See id. In June 2013, a Costa Rican court decided a return case under similar
reasoning. Id.
291. See U.S. D EP’ T OF S TATE : B UREAU OF C ONSULATE AFFAIRS , R EPORT ON
COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
CHILD ABDUCTION (2013), http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/compliance
Reports/2013.pdf [hereinafter 2013 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE].
292. Id.
293. 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24.
294. See id.
295. See 2013 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 291.
296. See 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24.
297. See id.
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preferable post-return arrangements for the parties, where a Guatemalan
court would likely circumvent the Convention’s intent on the basis of a
narrow, biased perspective.298 Moreover, unlike Honduran courts, which
have wrongfully assumed authority to make custody determinations
in Convention proceedings, international mediators would help resolve
cases in accordance with the Convention by taking the power to determine
such issues away from courts not located in the State of habitual residence.299
Under the current domestic resolution of Convention disputes, courts
must choose winners and losers. 300 With the option of international
mediation, courts would be more inclined to return children to their States of
habitual residence promptly because those courts would be assured of
their citizens’ safety abroad. Such safety could be satisfied through a wide
range of mediated agreements. Successful implementation of international
mediation in Hague Abduction Convention proceedings would thus
significantly improve compliance, replacing the current “black or white”
judicial approach with a more flexible, opportunistic system in which any
combination of colors is possible.

298. See 2013 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 291.
299. See 2014 REPORT ON COMPLIANCE, supra note 24.
300. See, e.g., Roosa, 1991 WL 204483, at *6 (ordering child’s return to his habitual
residence in Spain because the mother’s allegations of the father’s hostile and controlling
behavior were insufficient to establish the “grave risk” of harm required by the Convention).
Obviously, judges making decisions pursuant to the Convention must either order or refuse
to order the child’s return to his or her State of habitual residence. As a result, one parent
“wins” in a sense, while the other “loses.” Consider the hypothetical discussed above wherein
an American child is taken to Japan by his mother in breach of his U.S. citizen father’s
custody rights. If the father petitions in Japan for the child’s return and the Japanese court
ultimately decides that the Article 13(b) defense applies, the father will not return to
America with his child. At the same time, the child’s mother, who presumably took the child
to Japan intentionally, is permitted to remain there with the child.
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